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Introduction ge´ne´rale
L’importance des activite´s de fusions - acquisi-
tions
Conside´re´es parmi les strate´gies essentielles pour la croissance, les fusions et ac-
quisitions aident les entreprises a` re´duire le couˆt du capital de l’acque´reur, a`
de´velopper des synergies, a` acque´rir des actifs spe´cifiques, a` re´duire les risques
de la diversification, a` ame´liorer l’efficacite´ financie`re, a` augmenter aussi le pou-
voir de marche´, enfin a` e´quilibrer les cycles de revenus.
En tant que strate´gies d’entreprises, les fusions et acquisitions constituent des
options a` long terme a` la disposition de partenaires. Elles pre´sentent un inte´reˆt
a` la fois sur le plan productif, organisationnel, commercial et financier. Les fu-
sions semblent particulie`rement fre´quentes et pertinentes dans le secteur financier.
L’histoire de l’industrie bancaire montre des re´currences dans le domaine de la
consolidation. Ces fusions-acquisitions ont, depuis plus d’un sie`cle, peu a` peu re-
compose´ et modifie´ le panorama concurrentiel dans le secteur bancaire.
Ces fusions-acquisitions bancaires ont e´te´ par moments simplement motive´es par
l’e´volution de l’activite´ financie`re. Elles sont ainsi souvent conside´re´es par les ban-
quiers comme une strate´gie concurrentielle pertinente pour ge´rer le de´veloppement
des activite´s bancaires, ou pour moderniser leur organisation, pour restaurer la
confiance apre`s une crise, tout simplement pour assurer leur survie. Elles ont
beaucoup influe´ sur l’e´conomie mondiale, en particulier dans les phases de reprise
et de croissance.
1
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Par ailleurs, les fusions-acquisitions ont e´te´ ces dernie`res anne´es un des facteurs
marquants de l’accompagnement financier du de´veloppement dans de nombreux
pays e´mergents. Dans ces cas, les fusions et acquisitions sont spe´cifiquement
conc¸ues comme un moyen de moderniser le secteur bancaire, d’accroˆıtre son effi-
cacite´ a` partir de conditions initiales souvent caracte´rise´es par un syste`me financier
adapte´ a` une e´conomie moins ouverte, ou le roˆle de l’Etat e´tait plus important
qu’il ne l’est devenu par la suite.
Les mouvements re´cents de fusions - acquisitions
dans le secteur financier
Depuis la fin du sie`cle dernier et dans la plupart des e´conomies, les fusions -
acquisitions se sont de´veloppe´es dans le secteur financier. Aujourd’hui, un grand
nombre d’institutions financie`res nationales et internationales recourent a` de telles
ope´rations. Ces fusions - acquisitions ont eu beaucoup d’impact sur l’e´conomie
mondiale et ont permis de de´velopper l’industrie bancaire. Celle-ci est essentielle
a` la croissance et au de´veloppement e´conomique, ce qui suffit a` motiver l’inte´reˆt
que l’on peut leur porter.
La mondialisation est une des raisons du nombre croissant des fusions - acqui-
sitions dans le secteur financier, et en particulier dans le secteur bancaire. La
mondialisation stimule la croissance des entreprises internationales qui ont besoin
de plus de services financiers. De nombreuses banques ont ainsi mene´ des activite´s
de fusions et acquisitions pour e´largir leurs ope´rations, augmenter leur capital,
ame´liorer la capacite´ concurrentielle et leur re´sistance aux risques.
On peut situer le de´but du trend actuel des fusions et acquisitions dans le secteur
bancaire au de´but des anne´es 90. Ces fusions ont de´bute´ aux Etats Unis et se
sont propage´es au monde entier. Le secteur bancaire ame´ricain a e´te´ le premier a`
pratiquer a` grande e´chelle des activite´s de fusions – acquisitions, sans doute pour
apporter des solutions raisonnables a` des cas de concurrence exacerbe´e. Par ex-
emple, en 1998, Citicorp et Travelers Group ont fusionne´ pour former Citigroup
qui est devenu la plus grande entreprise de services financiers a` l’e´poque. First
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Chicago NBD Corp. a e´te´ acquise par la Bank One Corp. qui e´tait la cinquie`me
plus grande banque des E´tats-Unis; la 3e`me banque ame´ricaine - NationsBank
Corp. et la quatrie`me banque ame´ricaine - BankAmerica Corp. ont fusionne´ pour
former la Bank of America Corp. qui est devenu le deuxie`me banque ame´ricaine.
Suite aux e´volutions du secteur bancaire aux E´tats-Unis, les activite´s de fusions
– acquisitions se sont propage´es en Europe. L’Allemagne, l’Espagne, la France, la
Suisse, la Finlande et d’autres pays europe´ens ont contribue´ a` ces fusions. Par ex-
emple : la Deutsche Bank a achete´ Bankers Trust en 1998, la Deutsche Bank est de-
venue la plus premie`re institution financie`re au monde par sa taille a` cette e´poque.
Ces fusions et acquisitions ont ainsi permis aux pays europe´ens d’augmenter leurs
faculte´s d‘adaptation a` la concurrence internationale. Santillan-Salgado (2005)
rele`ve par exemple, en commentant la situation au de´but du sie`cle, que le secteur
bancaire aux E´tats-Unis a subi un processus de consolidation re´duisant de moitie´
le nombre de banques, le mouvement e´tant moins profond mais cependant marque´
en Europe aussi.
Les fusions - acquisitions bancaires dans les pays
e´mergents
Parmi les pays asiatiques, le Japon s’est distingue´ dans le domaine des fusions et
acquisitions bancaires. Apre`s la crise financie`re asiatique, la Core´e, l’Indone´sie,
la Malaisie, la Tha¨ılande et d’autres pays asiatiques ont duˆ aussi proce´der a` des
fusions et acquisitions dans le secteur bancaire pour permettre a` leur secteur ban-
caire de survivre a` la crise. Le Bre´sil, l’Argentine, le Venezuela, le Chili et d’autres
pays d’Ame´rique latine ont e´galement pris l’initiative de fusions - acquisitions dans
leur secteur bancaire.
La vague de fusions et acquisitions bancaires initie´e apre`s 1998 a souvent implique´
des banques cibles situe´es dans les pays e´mergents, acquises par des banques is-
sues de pays de´veloppe´s (banques internationales). Les processus de consolidation
des marche´s e´mergents se distinguent de deux des e´conomies de´veloppe´es : (1)
les fusions et acquisitions transfrontalie`res sont la source la plus importante de
la consolidation dans les pays e´mergents; (2) la consolidation est utilise´e pour
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restructurer le secteur bancaire des pays e´mergents apre`s des pe´riodes de crise
financie`re au lieu d’e´liminer les exce`s de capacite´, (3) les gouvernements des pays
e´mergents sont des participants actifs dans ces processus de consolidation (Gelos
and Roldos, 2004).
La libe´ralisation financie`re et les progre`s technologiques ont stimule´ les activite´s
de fusions et acquisitions transfrontalie`res en modifiant les politiques publiques
re´gulant l’entre´e des banques e´trange`res et la prise de participation des banques
e´trange`res dans le capital des banques nationales. Depuis le de´but des anne´es
90, les grandes banques internationales ont acquis de plus en plus fre´quemment
des actions de banques des pays e´mergents. Ce processus de consolidation inter-
nationale refle`te deux e´ve´nements contribuant a` e´quilibrer les forces du marche´
: (1) l’intensification de la concurrence sur les marche´s bancaires dans les pays
de´veloppe´s qui a force´ les grandes banques a` aller plus loin dans la recherche de
solutions pour diversifier les risques et ge´ne´rer des profits ; (2) l’abrogation des re-
strictions sur les investissements e´trangers et les activite´s des banques e´trange`res,
et la privatisation des institutions financie`res publiques par les gouvernements des
pays e´mergents.
Les crises financie`res ayant frappe´ les pays e´mergents dans les anne´es 90, on a pu
observer la faiblesse de la capitalisation locale et la ne´cessite´ d’encourager la par-
ticipation e´trange`re a` la recapitalisation et la consolidation au sein des secteurs
bancaires nationaux. Les grandes banques internationales souhaitaient acce´der
a` de nouveaux marche´s au meˆme moment que le syste`me bancaire des marche´s
e´mergents s’ouvrait aux capitaux e´trangers que ces banques internationales pou-
vaient fournir.
La situation en Chine
Le de´veloppement de l’industrie bancaire chinoise passe par trois e´tapes : la
pe´riode d’e´mergence et de de´veloppement (1949-1978), la pe´riode de re´forme suivie
d’un nouveau de´veloppement (1978-2008) et la pe´riode d’ajustement aux nouvelles
opportunite´s (de 2009 a` aujourd’hui).
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Depuis son adhe´sion a` l’Organisation mondiale du commerce (OMC) le 1er Jan-
vier 2002, la Chine a toujours applique´ une politique d’ouverture dans le secteur
bancaire. Toutes les restrictions pour les banques e´trange`res ont e´te´ supprime´es
en 2007.
Ainsi, dans leur pays d’origine, les banques chinoises sont en concurrence avec les
banques e´trange`res sans aucune protection du gouvernement chinois. Face a` cette
concurrence forte et directe des banques e´trange`res, les banques chinoises doivent
trouver leur meilleure voie de de´veloppement et utiliser des strate´gies approprie´es
pour rivaliser avec les banques e´trange`res. La forte pression concurrentielle pousse
les banques chinoises a` ame´liorer les performances et a` ame´liorer le service. Il est
de`s lors important d’avoir une bonne estimation de l’efficacite´ du secteur bancaire
chinois.
En tant qu’e´conomie e´mergente, la Chine a une structure e´conomique et politique
particulie`re. Le secteur bancaire chinois a ainsi accru sa diversite´, il s’est ouvert
a` l’exte´rieur et a` la concurrence, se transformant progressivement en une indus-
trie bancaire moderne. L’essentiel du secteur bancaire appartient a` l’Etat. Les 5
grandes banques commerciales publiques sont Industrial and Commercial Bank of
China Ltd, Agricultural Bank of China, Bank of China, China Construction Bank
Corporation et Bank of Communications Ltd. Plusieurs banques commerciales
nouvelles ont aussi e´merge´, des banques commerciales de province et les banques
tourne´es vers l’international, par exemple, Hua Xia Bank Co., Ltd, China Citic
Bank Co. Ltd, Shanghai Pudong Development Bank etc.
Le secteur bancaire chinois rencontre plusieurs proble`mes affectant sa compe´titivite´.
Pas de droit de proprie´te´ transparent, surabondance de preˆts non performants,
se´lectivite´ insuffisante sont les proble`mes principaux. En Chine, le marche´ des
droits de proprie´te´ est controˆle´ par le gouvernement, spe´cifiquement pour les ac-
tivite´s de fusions - acquisitions. Sur le marche´ chinois, ces ope´rations se soldent
toujours par des rachats controˆle´s par l’E´tat. Selon Kent, Guo et Zhang (2007),
la proportion des preˆts non performants des 4 plus grandes banques chinoises est
de 52,7% en 1997, 31,5% en 2000 et 22% en 2004. Ce ratio a diminue´ progressive-
ment, en laissant cependant des proportions beaucoup plus grandes que celles des
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banques e´trange`res.
Avec l’intensification de fusions - acquisitions associant des banques internationales
dans le secteur bancaire, la Banque Populaire de Chine a examine´ les diffe´rentes
manie`res de pratiquer des fusions - acquisitions dans les institutions financie`res.
Elle a inspire´ certaines mesures de soutien politiques pour les acque´reurs (elle leur
a par exemple fourni des soutiens politiques et les a aide´s a` se financer), a cherche´
a` re´soudre d’autres proble`mes (par exemple par la mise en place d’institutions
spe´ciales pour soutenir les activite´s de fusions et acquisitions) dans le secteur ban-
caire chinois.
Certaines e´conomies asiatiques ont adopte´ des principes conduisant a` une libe´ralisation
interne plus marque´e que la Chine. Pendant ce temps, la restructuration du secteur
financier chinois e´tait principalement finance´e par des e´missions obligataires apre`s
l’entre´e de la Chine dans l’OMC. Le niveau de pe´ne´tration des banques e´trange`res
en Chine reste en conse´quence tre`s faible et le gouvernement chinois applique
aux banques e´trange`res des exigences re´glementaires complique´es. Sur la base
de l’obligation le´gale du secteur bancaire chinois (les re`glements concernant les
banques e´trange`res), la part maximale qu’un investisseur individuel e´tranger peut
prendre dans une banque locale est de 20% et la participation e´trange`re totale est
fixe´e a` un maximum de 25% du total. Le gouvernement chinois a e´galement mis en
place l’exigence d’un actif minimum pour les banques e´trange`res : par exemple une
banque e´trange`re doit disposer d’un certain montant d’actifs pour l’e´tablissement
d’une succursale e´trange`re. Les succursales de banques e´trange`res ne sont pas ad-
mises comme banques de de´tail, seules les filiales des banques e´trange`res l’e´tant.
Sous ces conditions, les banques e´trange`res sont encourage´es a` s’inclure dans le
paysage bancaire chinois. Les banques e´trange`res qui n’investissent pas au mini-
mum 1 million de RMB ne peuvent pas ouvrir de succursales.
La situation d’autres pays Asiatiques
Une partie de ce travail analyse la situation de fac¸on globale, en essayant de tirer
quelques e´le´ments de comparaison entre 6 pays asiatiques (Chine, Inde, Indone´sie,
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Core´e, Philippines et Tha¨ılande).
Inde
Depuis le de´but des anne´es 1990, l’Inde a entame´ son processus de libe´ralisation fi-
nancie`re. L’environnement financier indien e´tait initialement plus libe´ral que celui
de la Chine. D’un point de vue ge´ne´ral, le gouvernement indien ne discrimine
pas entre les banques domestiques et les banques e´trange`res. Dans certains cas,
le gouvernement indien s’est meˆme montre´ plus favorable aux banques e´trange`res
qu’aux banques domestiques. Au sein du secteur bancaire indien, les banques
e´trange`res peuvent entreprendre presque toutes les activite´s bancaires. Le gou-
vernement indien a e´galement e´largi la pre´sence des banques e´trange`res dans son
secteur bancaire en leur permettant d’e´tablir des succursales a` l’e´tranger en pro-
prie´te´ exclusive. En outre, la participation e´trange`re maximale autorise´e dans les
banques indiennes est passe´e de 49% (avant la crise asiatique) a` 74%.
Philippines
Depuis la crise financie`re asiatique, les Philippines ont proce´de´ a` une importante
restructuration de leur syste`me bancaire. Comme les autres pays d’Asie, le gou-
vernement philippin a modifie´ la loi bancaire pour faciliter l’entre´e des banques
e´trange`res. Avant la crise, les Philippines avaient une attitude relativement libe´rale
face a` l’entre´e potentielle des banques e´trange`res. Apre`s la crise, le Banque Cen-
trale des Philippines a signe´ la nouvelle loi bancaire ge´ne´rale (2000) modifiant
l’ancienne en allant vers plus d’ouverture. Selon l’ancienne loi de libe´ralisation des
banques e´trange`res de 1994, les Philippines n’acceptaient que l’entre´e des banques
e´trange`res selon l’une des modalite´s suivantes: (1) l’acquisition d’un maximum
de 60% des actions d’une banque domestique existante, (2) la de´tention de 60%
au maximum des droits de vote d’une nouvelle filiale bancaire constitue´e dans
les Philippines, ou (3) l’e´tablissement une succursale de l’e´tablissement bancaire
(pour une dure´e de 5 ans, autorisation accorde´e a` un maximum de 10 banques
e´trange`res). La nouvelle loi e´largit l’entre´e des banques e´trange`res en portant ce
de´lai a` 7 ans. Toutefois, la loi souligne que la part des banques a` capitaux majori-
tairement e´trangers ne doit pas de´passer 30% du total des ressources ou des actifs
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du syste`me bancaire dans sa globalite´.
Indone´sie
Fortement affecte´e par la crise financie`re asiatique, l’Indone´sie a mene´ sa re´volution
financie`re sur la base d’un libe´ralisme enthousiaste. Elle a proce´de´ a` une restruc-
turation financie`re globale. En 1998, l’Agence indone´sienne de restructuration des
banques a e´te´ mise en place par le gouvernement indone´sien en vue de re´soudre les
proble`mes dans le secteur bancaire domestique. Le but de l’Agence indone´sienne
de restructuration des banques a e´te´ d’aborder la question des preˆts non perfor-
mants dans l’industrie bancaire domestique et de traiter les effets ne´gatifs de la
crise financie`re asiatique. En outre, le gouvernement indone´sien a e´galement intro-
duit d’importants changements re´glementaires. L’une des dispositions nouvelles
les plus importantes consiste en la suppression de certaines restrictions a` la partic-
ipation e´trange`re dans son secteur bancaire domestique. En vertu de la nouvelle
loi bancaire de 1998, les banques e´trange`res peuvent investir dans les banques
cote´es et non-cote´es, et les institutions non bancaires a` l’e´tranger. La nouvelle loi
bancaire a e´galement supprime´ les restrictions sur l’expansion des succursales de
banques joint-venture e´trange`res.
Core´e du Sud
Dans le processus de restructuration post-crise, le gouvernement sud-core´en a leve´
tous les obstacles re´glementaires pour encourager l’entre´e des banques e´trange`res.
Le choc de la crise financie`re asiatique a conduit le gouvernement sud-core´en a`
prendre conscience de l’importance d’un maintien du niveau de la participation
e´trange`re dans le but d’aider a` la recapitalisation et d’ame´liorer l’efficacite´ des
banques domestiques. Ainsi, le gouvernement core´en a encourage´ l’investissement
e´tranger en Core´e en levant les obstacles financiers. Avant la crise asiatique, la
limite de participation e´trange`re e´tait de 49%. Apre`s la crise, la commission de
surveillance financie`re de Core´e a supprime´ cette restriction et a permis aux ban-
ques e´trange`res une participation de 100%. Quand les seuils de 10%, 25% et 33%
et 100% sont atteints, la banque e´trange`re doit cependant eˆtre approuve´e par la
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commission de surveillance financie`re de Core´e.
Tha¨ılande
De fac¸on similaire a` d’autres libe´ralisations agressives, la Tha¨ılande a mene´ la
re´forme de sa re´glementation financie`re apre`s la crise financie`re asiatique, en por-
tant pour une pe´riode de 10 ans a` 100% le maximum de la part d’investisseurs
e´trangers dans les institutions financie`res domestiques. En 2004, le plan du secteur
financier permet aux banques e´trange`res d’appliquer deux types de licences : (1)
une banque e´trange`re be´ne´ficie, en tant que filiale, du meˆme champ d’activite´
qu’en tant que banque commerciale domestique, et peut ouvrir une succursale dans
Bangkok et 3 succursales ailleurs dans Tha¨ılande; (2) une banque e´trange`re peut
be´ne´ficier d’une succursale e´trange`re propre et jouir du meˆme champ d’activite´
que les autres banques commerciales, mais n’est pas autorise´ a` ouvrir d’autres
succursales.
L’impact de la banque e´trange`re sur l’industrie
bancaire domestique
Globalement, l’entre´e de banques e´trange`res peut affecter le niveau de concurrence
de l’industrie bancaire domestique, influer sur l’efficacite´ des banques domestiques,
et avoir un impact sur la stabilite´ du syste`me bancaire domestique. L’entre´e des
banques e´trange`res a donc des effets positifs et des effets ne´gatifs pour l’industrie
bancaire nationale. Lorsque les banques e´trange`res accroissent leur pre´sence sur
le marche´ domestique, elles exercent une pression sur les banques domestiques
les conduisant a` effectuer certaines re´formes : elles exercent une pression a` la
re´duction des couˆts, elles poussent leurs concurrentes locales a` diversifier leurs
produits et services, a` adopter une organisation plus efficace, a` apprendre de leurs
pratiques. L’entre´e des banques e´trange`res a aussi des effets concurrentiels plus
ne´gatifs : plus de concurrence peut re´duire les marges et les be´ne´fices. Toutefois,
l’entre´e d’une banque e´trange`re a aussi un “effet d’e´cre´mage” pour les banques
domestiques ayant une expe´rience dans les transactions internationales. Les ban-
ques e´trange`res peuvent attirer de bons clients de banques domestiques, offrir de
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meilleurs produits et services, avoir un meilleur acce`s aux marche´s financiers inter-
nationaux. Les banques domestiques pourraient paˆtir de ces diffe´rents avantages
des banques e´trange`res. De nombreux travaux empiriques illustrent ce diagnostic.
Goldberg, Dages et Kinney (2000) rele`vent ainsi 3 arguments en faveur de l’ouverture
des secteurs financiers domestiques a` la proprie´te´ e´trange`re : (1) l’entre´e des ban-
ques e´trange`res diversifie le capital, augmente le montant du financement, soutient
l’offre de cre´dit domestique et augmente la stabilite´ de preˆts disponibles; (2) elle
peut e´galement ame´liorer la qualite´, le prix et la disponibilite´ des produits et ser-
vices financiers; (3) elle peut enfin ame´liorer l’organisation du syste`me financier, les
proce´dures comptables, la transparence du syste`me, la re´glementation financie`re.
Clarke, Cull, D’Amato et Molinari (1999) analysent la situation des banques ar-
gentines au milieu de la de´cennie 1990 et constatent que l’entre´e des banques
e´trange`res est associe´e a` une concurrence accrue dans le secteur bancaire domes-
tique et a` une efficacite´ accrue des banques nationales. Demirguc-Kunt, Levine et
Min (1998) travaillent sur un large e´chantillon de pays au cours de la pe´riode 1988-
1995, et constatent que la participation de banques e´trange`re diminue l’incidence
de crises bancaires locales et acce´le`re la croissance e´conomique globale en ren-
forc¸ant l’efficacite´ du secteur bancaire domestique.
Claessens, Demirfu¨c¸-Kunt et Huizinga (2001) analysent l’e´tendue et l’effet de la
pre´sence des banques e´trange`res sur le marche´ domestique a` l’aide de 7900 banques
de 80 pays pour la pe´riode 1988-1995. Ils observent que les be´ne´fices des banques
e´trange`res sont plus e´leve´s que ceux des banques domestiques des pays e´mergents
et soulignent que l’entre´e des banques e´trange`res pour les pays e´mergents est
associe´e a` une re´duction de la rentabilite´ et de la marge pour les banques domes-
tiques.
Hermes et Lensink (2001) reproduisent l’analyse de Claessens, Demirfu¨c¸Kunt et
Huizinga (2001) pour les pays e´mergents. Ils trouvent que l’entre´e de banques
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e´trange`res conduit a` la croissance des revenus, des be´ne´fices et des couˆts des ban-
ques domestiques. Leurs re´sultats indiquent que les couˆts et les be´ne´fices ne dimin-
uent que si l’entre´e des banques e´trange`res a atteint un certain niveau.
Goldberg, Dages et Kinney (2000) mettent en e´vidence 3 arguments principaux
contre l’ouverture du syste`me financier domestique a` la proprie´te´ e´trange`re: (1)
l’accroissement des capitaux e´trangers dans les institutions financie`res diminue la
stabilite´ du secteur financier domestique; (2) les e´tablissements e´trangers ont un “
effet d’e´cre´mage” en attirant des clients de haut niveau aupre`s des banques domes-
tiques, (3) plusieurs institutions financie`res e´trange`res dans l’industrie financie`re
domestique augmentera les de´fis pour la supervision.
Uiboupin (2004) e´value l’effet de l’entre´e des banques e´trange`res sur la performance
des banques en Europe centrale et de l’Est, et souligne que l’entre´e de banques
e´trange`res augmente la concurrence dans les pays d’accueil et a un effet ne´gatif sur
la rentabilite´, les revenus et le revenu autre que d’inte´reˆts des banques domestiques.
Hellmann, Murdock et Stiglitz (2000) trouvent que l’entre´e des banques e´trange`res
de´truit la valeur des banques nationales, mais qu’il facilite aussi l’investissement
prudent.
Pre´sentation du plan et re´sume´ des chapitres de
la the`se
Le premier chapitre de cette the`se est une revue de la litte´rature ge´ne´rale relative
aux fusions-acquisitions bancaires. Les fusions - acquisitions constituent l’un des
moyens les plus importants du de´veloppement des services financiers. La tendance
aux fusions -acquisitions dans le secteur bancaire a eu un impact important sur
l’e´conomie mondiale. Les fusions-acquisitions ont aussi e´te´ fondamentales pour
le de´veloppement de l’industrie bancaire. Dans la mesure ou` l’activite´ bancaire
s’ave`re cruciale a` la croissance et le de´veloppement e´conomique, il est important
d’analyser les activite´s de fusions-acquisitions dans le secteur bancaire.
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Le deuxie`me chapitre propose une analyse empirique des activite´s de fusions et
acquisitions dans le secteur bancaire chinois. Le degre´ d’ouverture de l’industrie
bancaire chinoise a augmente´ depuis la fin des anne´es 70. Apre`s l’adhe´sion a`
l’Organisation Mondiale du Commerce (OMC) le 1er Janvier 2002, la Chine a ap-
plique´ une politique d’ouverture dans le secteur bancaire. De nombreuses restric-
tions affectant les banques e´trange`res ont e´te´ leve´es en 2007. En Chine, les ban-
ques chinoises sont donc actuellement en concurrence avec les banques e´trange`res.
Face a` une concurrence forte et directe des banques e´trange`res, il faut trouver
la meilleure voie de de´veloppement et conduire les banques chinoises a` adopter
les strate´gies approprie´es. La forte pression concurrentielle pousse ces banques a`
ame´liorer leurs performances et leurs services, a` bien utiliser les ressources ban-
caires. Il est de`s lors important d’estimer correctement l’efficacite´ du secteur ban-
caire chinois : cette analyse inte´resse non seulement les gestionnaires des banques
chinoises, mais aussi les de´cideurs dont l’objectif peut eˆtre d’e´valuer et d’ame´liorer
la viabilite´ bancaire.
Akhavein, Berger et Humphrey (1997) appliquent une analyse en termes de frontie`re
de production a` l’e´tude des me´gafusions bancaires dans aux Etats Unis et trouvent
qu’elles entrainent une ame´lioration importante de l’efficacite´ des banques sur la
base d’une analyse des profits des banques fusionne´es. En particulier, les banques
dont les rendements sont plus faibles avant la fusion be´ne´ficient de la meilleure
ame´lioration en termes d’efficacite´. Zhang (2003) utilise une analyse DEA pour
estimer 41 banques chinoises entre l’anne´e de 1997 et 2001. Les re´sultats mon-
trent que (1) les banques commerciales prive´es sont plus efficaces que les banques
commerciales publiques ; (2) l’ame´lioration de la capacite´ de gestion interne pour-
rait ame´liorer l’efficacite´ de l’allocation bancaire ; et (3) l’e´volution des conditions
e´conomiques et la politique de re´glementation affectent le niveau d’efficacite´ des
banques commerciales chinoises. Yang et Zhang (2007) ont re´alise´ une analyse
DEA pour 14 banques commerciales chinoises entre l’anne´e de 1996 et 2005, et
leurs re´sultats montrent au contraire que la rentabilite´ et l’efficacite´ des banques
commerciales prive´es est infe´rieure a` celle des banques commerciales publiques.
Il n’y a que peu d’e´tudes consacre´es a` la variation de la productivite´ totale des
facteurs des banques commerciales chinoises. Avec l’indice de Malquist, on peut
en revanche identifier diffe´rence de productivite´ entre les entreprises. L’indice de
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Malquist a nombreux avantages: par exemple il ne ne´cessite pas la maximisation
du profit ou la minimisation des couˆts. En outre, les deux parties issues de la
de´composition de l’indice de Malmquist aident les analystes a` mieux comprendre
l’e´volution de l’efficacite´. C’est donc une me´thode approprie´e a` l’e´valuation de la
productivite´ de l’industrie bancaire.
Le deuxie`me chapitre propose une analyse des ratios financiers a` l’aide de la tech-
nique d’analyse DEA qui examine les frontie`res d’efficience des unite´s avant et
apre`s fusion. En utilisant des donne´es extraites de l’Annuaire du secteur ban-
caire, de l’Annuaire statistique de la Chine et des rapports annuels des banques
chinoises, j’utilise un mode`le empirique du type “Malmquist total factor produc-
tivity change”. J’analyse 14 banques commerciales chinoises entre l’anne´e 1998
et 2007 en utilisant l’indice de Malmquist. Les re´sultats montrent que la pro-
ductivite´ de ces 14 banques commerciales chinoises s’est accrue annuellement de
6,3% au cours de la de´cennie 1998-2007. Avec l’informatisation, les progre`s tech-
nologiques expliquent essentiellement l’ame´lioration de la productivite´. En raison
de la mauvaise gestion interne, de la faible qualite´ du service, de nombreux preˆts
non performants et de l’intervention du gouvernement, les re´sultats de l’analyse
prouvent que les plus grandes banques n’ont pas e´te´ tre`s performantes.
Le but du l’analyse DEA n’est pas seulement de mesurer la valeur, mais aussi
de re´ve´ler les de´terminants de la productivite´ totale des facteurs (TFPC). Les
e´quipes dirigeantes des banques pourraient, a` partir de ces mesures, preˆter plus
d’attention a` l’ame´lioration de ces de´terminants, et finalement ame´liorer la TFPC
des banques chinoises. J’ai alors poursuivi mes recherches, pour bien comprendre
l’e´volution de l’efficacite´ du secteur bancaire chinois.
J’ai aussi effectue´ une analyse de re´gression. Les re´sultats de cette re´gression mon-
trent que le taux de croissance du PIB a influence´ de manie`re remarquablement
positive l’indice TFPC des banques commerciales chinoises. La croissance du PIB
a ame´liore´ l’efficacite´ du secteur bancaire chinois. L’inflation a une influence re-
marquablement ne´gative sur l’index TFPC des banques commerciales chinoises.
Les banques chinoises pourraient ainsi changer la structure financie`re de l’actif
et du passif pour be´ne´ficier de l’inflation a` venir. Par conse´quent, au terme de
l’analyse de re´gression, il apparait qu’un environnement macro-e´conomique sain
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et stable, et une bonne structuration de la banque sont tre`s importants pour les
banques commerciales chinoises. Les e´quipes dirigeantes des banques chinoises
doivent donc continuer a` optimiser la structure du secteur bancaire les processus
ope´rationnels internes, si l’on admet que la croissance du pays est un e´le´ment qui
leur e´chappe, lorsqu’on ces banques sont prises individuellement.
Le troisie`me chapitre utilise un mode`le the´orique pour analyser l’effet complexe
d’entre´e des banques e´trange`res sur l’activite´ des banques domestiques. Les pays
e´mergents mettent en œuvre des re´formes structurelles dans leurs secteurs fi-
nanciers nationaux qui s’accompagnent de l’entre´e de plus en plus de banques
e´trange`res sur ces marche´s e´mergents. Dans les pays e´mergents, les banques
e´trange`res sont plus efficaces que les banques nationales. Ainsi, les nouveaux
arrivants peuvent ame´liorer l’efficacite´ non seulement des banques nationales,
mais aussi du secteur bancaire dans son ensemble. Claessens, Demirfu¨c¸-Kunt
et Huizinga (2000) montrent que les banques e´trange`res ont eu dans les pays
e´mergents une meilleure rentabilite´ et de meilleurs marges d’inte´reˆt que les ban-
ques domestiques, et les entre´es des banques e´trange`res peuvent forcer les banques
de pays e´mergents plus efficace.
Toutefois, l’entre´e des banques e´trange`res peut avoir des effets ne´gatifs pour les
pays e´mergents. Sur la base de l’observation de plusieurs pays et de l’e´volution
de la banque chinoise, Bonin et Huang (2002) observent que, dans la plupart des
cas, les banques e´trange`res sont en concurrence avec les banques domestiques pour
les clients d’entreprises rentables et les clients individuels riches. En outre, bien
que les banques domestiques aient des avantages informationnels et de bonnes re-
lations cliente`le, les banques e´trange`res peuvent attirer leurs clients avec des prix
compe´titifs.
Clarke, Cull, Martinez Peria (2006) combinent les re´ponses d’une enqueˆte d’environ
3000 entreprises dans 35 pays e´mergents et en transition, avec des donne´es sur
la participation des banques e´trange`res. Ils estiment que l’entre´e des banques
e´trange`res peut re´duire l’acce`s au cre´dit, en particulier pour certains secteurs de
l’e´conomie comme les petites et moyennes entreprises (PMEs). Ils montrent en
outre que l’acce`s re´duit au cre´dit pour les entreprises peut avoir un impact ne´gatif
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conside´rable sur l’e´conomie globale dans des nombreux pays e´mergents. Detra-
giache, Tressel, et Gupta (2008) proposent un mode`le the´orique pour montrer
que l’entre´e de banques e´trange`res a un effet d’e´cre´mage qui augmente les couˆts
d’exploitation globaux et re´duit le bien-eˆtre global. Le mode`le montre que l’entre´e
de banques e´trange`res be´ne´ficie seulement aux entreprises les plus transparentes,
laissant les autres entreprises dans une meilleure ou dans une moins bonne situa-
tion.
L’entre´e de banques e´trange`res peut donc ame´liorer la gestion des e´tablissements
acquis et attirer des clients aupre`s des banques nationales, par un “effet e´cre´mage”
pre´judiciable aux profits des banques domestiques, malgre´ l’ame´lioration de l’efficacite´
de gestion. Si l’entre´e de banques e´trange`res se fait par fusions-acquisitions,
l’accroissement de la part des banques e´trange`res dans le capital des banques na-
tionales diminue les profits, les capacite´s et le controˆle des actionnaires nationaux.
Je mode´lise trois modes d’entre´e de banques e´trange`res : (1) la cre´ation d’une
nouvelle filiale, (2) des fusions et acquisitions avec une banque publique (grande
banque ge´ne´raliste) et (3) des fusions et acquisitions avec des Joint Stock Banks
(petites banques spe´cialise´es). Lorsque le marche´ des preˆts “normaux” n’est pas
entie`rement couvert par les banques domestiques, ce qui peut s’identifier a` une situ-
ation de rationnement du cre´dit, les re´sultats du mode`le e´tablissent que l’entre´e des
banques e´trange`res peut ame´liorer la situation ge´ne´rale dans le secteur bancaire,
compensant ainsi la partie ou entie`rement l’“effet e´cre´mage” par une stimulation
indirecte des banques nationales.
Le mode`le analyse aussi l’effet de lois re´glementaires possibles introduites par
l’autorite´ nationale en vue d’ame´liorer les limites ade´quates a` l’entre´e. Nous con-
statons que, lorsque l’entre´e de banques e´trange`res se fait par la cre´ation d’une
nouvelle filiale, les effets positifs dominent les effets ne´gatifs quand la banque
e´trange`re a un assez bon acce`s aux marche´s mone´taires internationaux. Nous
avons e´galement constate´ que l’inte´reˆt d’une limitation des ressources en prove-
nance de banques e´trange`res dans le capital des banques domestiques de´pend de
la balance faite par les autorite´s domestiques du point de vue du bien-eˆtre entre
la richesse des actionnaires initiaux et celle des futurs actionnaires des banques
domestiques, ce qui e´quivaut a` renvoyer la re´ponse a` une appre´ciation du controˆle
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du capital et pas seulement du bien-eˆtre imme´diat attendu de l’entre´e de banques
e´trange`res.
Par la suite, sur la base de l’utilisation de la base de donne´es “Thomson One”, le
quatrie`me chapitre de the`se est consacre´ a` une l’analyse empirique (une analyse de
re´gression) pour de 6 pays asiatiques (Chine, Inde, Indone´sie, Core´e, Philippines
et Tha¨ılande). Ce travail e´conome´trique examine l’effet de banques e´trange`res
avant et apre`s des ope´rations de fusions-acquisitions dans le secteur bancaire do-
mestique. Ces pays ont effectue´ des changements re´glementaires cruciaux dans
leurs secteurs bancaires depuis la crise financie`re asiatique. Bien que diffe´rentes,
ces re´formes ont re´duit les obstacles a` la pe´ne´tration de banques e´trange`res. Sur
la base de l’analyse des Sasidaran et Ramkishen (2010), nous pouvons se´parer
les pays asiatiques en 2 groupes, en fonction des re`glementations qui limitent les
capitaux propres e´trangers dans le secteur bancaire national : les libe´raux ent-
housiastes (Indone´sie, Core´e, Tha¨ılande et Philippines) et les libe´raux prudents
(Chine et Inde).
Ce chapitre de´montre l’impact de l’entre´e des banques e´trange`res sur la perfor-
mance bancaire dans six pays e´mergents d’Asie. Nos re´sultats indiquent que
l’entre´e des banques e´trange`res est associe´e a` une augmentation de la rentabilite´
des banques domestiques. Nous avons constate´ que les fusions-acquisitions entre
des banques domestiques et e´trange`res ont un effet positif sur la rentabilite´ des ban-
ques domestiques, en particulier pour les activite´s ne´cessitant le moins d’expertise.
Nos re´sultats font cependant apparaˆıtre une certaine he´te´roge´ne´ite´ des effets de
ces fusions, en fonction de l’historique des syste`mes bancaires nationaux et de la
nature des re´glementations passe´es ou en cours. Nos re´sultats montrent ainsi que,
pour ces six pays asiatiques, le taux de pe´ne´tration des banques e´trange`res est plus
important si la banque e´trange`re a de´ja` mene´ une activite´ de fusions - acquisitions
avec les banques nationales. L’entre´e des banques e´trange`res a a` la fois un effet
direct sur l’industrie bancaire domestique, l’anne´e en cours et l’anne´e suivante. En
ge´ne´ral, les effets directs sont plus forts que l’effet avec de´calage d’un an.
Chapter 1
Literature Review
1.1 Concept of M&As activities
Considered as one of the essential growth strategies, Merger and Acquisition
(M&A) represent one company purchases of entire companies or specific assets
of another company (Yang & Hyland, 2006; Ahern & Weston, 2007). Generally
speaking, M&A activities help companies lower the acquirer’s cost of capital, get
synergy, acquire unique capabilities and resources, reduce diversification risk, im-
prove financial efficiency, build up market power and balance the revenue cycles
(Yang & Hyland, 2006).
M&A activities “have been defined to be the purchase of entire companies or spe-
cific assets by another company” (Ahern & Weston, 2007). For both economies
and individual firms, M&A activities carry out important functions and encom-
pass many financial theory and corporate financial policy (Copeland, Weston &
Shastri, 2007). The high level of M&A activities can also be a characteristic of
the global economy.
According to Weston, Chung and Siu (1990), some M&A activities represent a
new force that lead economies, provide creativities and productivities by internal
restructuring, and related corporate control activities; while to others, the same
activities are regarded as blight. That is to say, 1+1 may not be bigger than 2.
The theories of “Big is beautiful” and “Too big to fail” sometimes would lead
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companies to unreasonably choose the M&A strategy.
In general, the motivation of M&A as choice emphasizes lowering the acquirer’s
cost of capital, improving financial efficiency, building up market power, balancing
revenue cycles and reducing diversification risk (Yang & Hyland, 2006).
M&A activities are classified by the form of integration: statutory merger, sub-
sidiary mergers and consolidation. In addition, M&A activities could also be
categorized by different relatedness of the merging companies’ business activities,
for example: horizontal merger, vertical merger and conglomerate merger.
Currently, M&A activities take place in many industries. Energy and power, real
estate, high technology, consumer staples and Financial Services are top five im-
portant consolidating industries which drive the biggest transactions (See FIGURE
2.1).
Figure 1.1: Worldwide Announced M&A Target industry by value.
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1.2 Mergers and Acquisitions in Financial Mar-
ket
As a corporate strategy, Merger and Acquisition is one of the most important
means of financial services development. Since the end of last century, M&A ac-
tivities in financial sector have become more and more familiar in the majority
of all the countries in the world. Nowadays, a large number of international and
domestic financial institutions all over the world are engaging in M&A activities.
Moreover, the trend of M&A in the banking industry has had a great impact on
the global economy. M&A activities have been one of the most important factors
for the development of the banking industry. Since the banking industry is vital to
the growth and the development of the world economic, it is important to analyze
these M&A activities in banking industry.
1.3 Global Trend of M&As Activities in the Bank-
ing Industry
Due to the globalization, more and more M&As activities are emerging in the
financial industry, especially in the banking industry. Globalization stimulates the
growth of the international companies who need more financial services. Many
banks carried out M&As activities in order to expand their scale of operation,
increase the strength of capital and improve the competitive power and ability of
resisting risk.
The wave of M&As activities in the banking industry began in the early 1990s
and until now, came from America and then spread to the whole world. In order
to maintain the overlord position all over the world The U.S. banking industry
deployed large-scale of M&A activities. For example, in 1998, Citicorp and Trav-
elers Group merged to form Citigroup which became the biggest financial service
company at that time. First Chicago NBD Corp. merged into the Bank One Corp.
which was the fifth biggest bank in U.S.; the 3rd US bank - NationsBank Corp.
And the fourth US bank - BankAmerica Corp. merged into the Bank of America
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Corp. which became the second U.S. Bank.
Under the pressure of U.S. banking industry revolution, European countries fol-
lowed to perform M&As activities in their banking industry quickly and efficiently.
For instance, Deutsche Bank bought Bankers Trust in 1998 and became the largest
financial institution in the world at that time. Meanwhile, Spain, France, Switzer-
land, Finland and some other European countries also started M&A activities in
the banking industry. With M&As activities in the European banking industry,
European countries can boost their ability of international competition. Santillan-
Salgado (2005) indicated that M&A activities made intensive reduction in number
of banking institutions, for instance the U.S. banking industry suffered a dramatic
compacting process that reduced the number of banks by half.
Among Asian countries, Japan is the most remarkable one in M&As activities
in the banking industry. After the Asian Financial Crisis, Korea, Indonesia,
Malaysia, Thailand and other Asian countries had to undertake M&A activities
in the banking industry as a way to improve their ability of keeping away and
resolving financial risk. Similarly, Brazil, Argentina, Venezuela, Chile and some
other Latin America countries also undertook M&A activities in their banking
industry.
1.4 M&As Activities in the Chinese Banking In-
dustry
As one of the emerging economies, China has a special economic and political
structure. The Chinese banking industry has become a varied, open, and com-
petitive bank system now and has gradually changed into a modern commercial
banking industry. Generally, the majority of Chinese banking industry is state-
owned. The big 5 state-owned commercial banks are Industrial and Commercial
Bank of China Ltd, Agricultural Bank of China, Bank of China, China Construc-
tion Bank Corporation and Bank of Communications Ltd. There are also some
new joint-stock commercial banks, province-level commercial banks and overseas
banks, for example, Hua Xia Bank Co., Ltd, China Citic Bank Co., Ltd, Shanghai
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Pudong Development Bank etc.
Chinese banking industry has several big problems which can weaken the compet-
itive ability of Chinese banks. No transparent property right, superabundance of
non-performing loans, and the extensive economy mode are the main problems.
In China, the property rights market is controlled by the government specifically
for M&A activities. M&A activities in the Chinese market always take place
through state-controlled takeovers, such as the Property Rights Trading Center.
The Property Rights Market effectively prevents the loss of state assets and pro-
vides an open platform for M&A activities.
According to paper of Kent, Guo and Zhang (2007), the non-performing loans
ratio of the largest 4 Chinese banks are 52.7% in 1997, 31.5% in 2000 and 22% in
2004. Although the non-performing loans ratio decreased gradually, these values
are much bigger than that of other foreign banks. The extensive economy mode
means Chinese banks increase the inputs to increase the outputs, without the im-
provement of technology or efficiency.
With the intensification of international M&A activities in the banking industry,
the Chinese central bank, People’s Bank of China, tried to explore how to conduct
M&As activities of financial institutions, undertook some political supports for
the acquirers (e.g. providing political supports and helping them to finance), and
quested for the methods to solve the problems (e.g. setting up special institutions
to support the M&A activities) in the Chinese banking industry.
1.5 Bank Regulations and Supervision
Since banking industry is vital to financial stability of a country, national gov-
ernment also sets up special regulations to protect their banking industry, for
instance, constituting barriers for foreign bank entry, protecting local banks from
foreign investors and etc. These kinds of protection activities not only take place
in developing countries but also in developed countries.
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After the creation of the European Union (EU), EU countries have moved different
barriers to cross-border banking M&A activities with the aim of the harmoniza-
tion of regulations and liberalization. Commission of the European Communities
(2005) made analysis about cross-border consolidation activities in the EU finan-
cial sector and found that cross-border M&A activities in financial sector are weak
comparing to other sectors. In considering a differential in size of the acquiring
and acquired companies, in the financial sector domestic deals are significantly
larger than cross-border ones; while in the non-financial sectors domestic deals are
smaller than cross-border ones (Commission of the European Communities, 2005).
The analysis of representative bodies for the financial sector presents several
primary obstacles for cross-border consolidations in financial sector: (1) non-
overlapping fixed costs, (2) multiple reporting requirements, (3) dividend taxa-
tion, (4) differences in product mix and (5) employees’ reluctance (Commission of
the European Communities, 2005). The analysis of respondents other than rep-
resentative bodies for the financial sector shows that shareholders’ apprehension
of failure risks, absence of critical size and differences in economic cycles are main
obstacles for cross-border consolidations in financial sector (Commission of the
European Communities, 2005).
There are many cases demonstrate domestic government can constitute barriers to
banking market integration in the EU. In 1998, the French Government announced
its decision to sell the Cre´dit Industriel et Commercial (CIC) banking group to
the Cre´dit Mutuel, even though the Dutch ABN Amro group had excellent track
record comparing with other French bidders. French political influence played a
very important role in this bidding war.
Chapter 2
Efficiency of China’s commercial
banks: Malmquist total factor
productivity analysis
2.1 Introduction of the Chapter 2
Assaulted by a strong trend of globalization, a huge pressure of competition and
turbulent financial markets, commercial banks are continuously seeking new and
safer ways to improve their performance, and to provide more products and service
for clients.
The degree of openness of the Chinese banking industry has been increased since
late 70’s of the last century. After joining the World Trade Organization (WTO)
on the first January, 2002, China has continuously enforced the so-called open
door policy in the Chinese banking industry. All restrictions for foreign banks
were cancelled in 2007. That is to say, in China the Chinese banks compete with
foreign banks without any protection of Chinese government. Facing with strong
and direct competition from the overseas banks, it is pressing for Chinese banks
to find the best pathway for self-development and to use appropriate strategies
in order to compete with foreign banks. The high competitive pressure pushes
Chinese banks to improve performance, to ameliorate service and to fully utilize
inputs. Therefore, it is important to have a good estimation of the efficiency of
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the Chinese banking industry: this analysis could assist not only the managers
of Chinese banks but also help the policy makers evaluate and improve banks’
competitive viability.
The actual bank production process is like a black box: it is difficult to clearly
estimate how a bank contributes to the value newly created by an economy which
made by interconnected firms, consumers, financial institutions and public govern-
ments. Even if the method we use clearly excludes the external effects which are
important in complex economic environments, the microeconomic efficiency of the
bank production process - evaluated by the amount of output produced compared
with certain amount of inputs - is a necessary stage for a more complete estima-
tion of the bank industry’s contribution to the global performances of the national
economy. This chapter proposes to use the Malmquist total factor productivity
analysis of the Chinese banking industry to provide internal estimation of the
bank efficiency. We use this method to measure the technical efficiency change,
the technical change in the production technology, the pure technical efficiency
change, and the scale efficiency change of the 14 Chinese commercial banks from
year 1998 to year 2007.
Section 2.2 presents a brief overview of the Chinese banking system. A review of
the related studies is provided in section 2.3. I present the methodology in section
2.4, then data in section 2.5 where I also define the content of the input and out-
put we consider. I present the results of the study in section 2.6, the regression
analysis in 2.7 and conclude in section 2.8.
2.2 Brief overview of the Chinese banking sys-
tem
As one of the most important pillars of the Chinese financial sector, the Chinese
banking industry is vital to sustain the economic growth. The current banking
system dates from 1949, which is the date of establishment of the People’s Re-
public of China. According to the development process of the current Chinese
banking industry, there are three stages: the formation and development period
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(from 1949 to 1978), the reform and development period (from 1949 to 2008) and
the period of adjustment and opportunities (from 2009 to 2012).
As one of the emerging economies, China has a special economic and political
structure. The Chinese banking industry has become a varied, open, and com-
petitive bank system now and has gradually changed into a modern commercial
banking industry. Generally, the majority of Chinese banking industry is state-
owned. The big 5 state-owned commercial banks are Industrial and Commercial
Bank of China Ltd, Agricultural Bank of China, Bank of China, China Construc-
tion Bank Corporation and Bank of Communications Ltd. There are also some
new joint-stock commercial banks, province-level commercial banks and overseas
banks, for example, Hua Xia Bank Co., Ltd, China Citic Bank Co., Ltd, Shanghai
Pudong Development Bank etc.
Chinese banking industry has several big problems which can weaken the compet-
itive ability of Chinese banks. No transparent property right, superabundance of
non-performing loans, and the extensive economy mode are the main problems.
In China, the property rights market is controlled by the government specifically
for M&A activities. M&A activities in the Chinese market always take place
through state-controlled takeovers, such as the Property Rights Trading Center.
The Property Rights Market effectively prevents the loss of state assets and pro-
vides an open platform for M&A activities. According to paper of Matthews, Guo
and Zhang (2007), the non-performing loans ratio of the largest 4 Chinese banks
are 52.7% in 1997, 31.5% in 2000 and 22% in 2004. Although the non-performing
loans ratio decreased gradually, these values are much bigger than that of other
foreign banks. The extensive economy mode means Chinese banks increase the
inputs to increase the outputs, without the improvement of technology or efficiency.
With the intensification of international M&A activities in the banking industry,
the Chinese central bank, People’s Bank of China, tried to explore how to conduct
M&As activities of financial institutions, undertook some political supports for
the acquirers (e.g. providing political supports and helping them to finance), and
quested for the methods to solve the problems (e.g. setting up special institutions
to support the M&A activities) in the Chinese banking industry.
Chapter 2. Efficiency of China’s commercial banks: Malmquist total factor
productivity analysis 26
2.3 Overview of the related studies
The first attempts to analyze bank efficiency tend to focus on economies of scale
and scope. The last period approaches generally apply X-efficiency and total fac-
tor productivity change analysis to evaluate bank efficiency.
Since the early fifties, bank efficiency is considered in the academic literature, gen-
erally by a reference to the economies of scale and of scope integrated by the bank
technology. Alhadeff (1954) use financial ratio analysis for 210 California banks
between the period from 1938 to 1950, and found that there displayed an increasing
return to scale of output and a decreasing return to scale of cost. McKillop, Glass,
and Morikawa (1996) investigate researches with an application to economies of
scope in banking and confirm the existence of such economies for the large Japanese
banks. Karafolas and Mantakas (1996) observe also operating-cost scale economies
in the Greek banking industry but not total-cost scale economies during the pe-
riod 1980 - 1989. Focus on the intensive trend of consolidation in the European
banking industry in recent years, the study of Cavallo and Rossi (2001) shows that
recent regulatory changes and progresses in technology have contributed to raising
the optimal scale and mergers should be oriented to increase bank scale for small
banks and to expand into new product lines for large banks.
The late 21th century, more and more researches of the efficiency of the banking
industry consider the production efficiency which is usually measured by frontier
analysis. There are two common approaches for the frontier analysis: Parametric
approach and Non-parametric. Akhavein, Berger and Humphrey (1997) apply a
frontier profit function on bank megamergers in the U.S. banking industry and
find that there was a significant profit efficiency improvement for merged banks,
especially for banks who have the lowest efficiencies prior to merging have great-
est improvement. Isik and Hassa (2002) employ a non-parametric approach along
with a parametric approach to estimate the efficiency of Turkish banks over the
1988-1996 period, finding that the heterogeneous characteristics of banks have
significant impact on their efficiency and bank managements is responsible for
scale inefficiency operation. Havrylchyk (2006) investigates DEA analysis for the
polish banking industry between 1997 and 2001: the results indicate that “dur-
ing the years analyzed greenfield banks have achieved higher levels of efficiency
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than domestic banks, foreign banks that acquired domestic institutions have not
succeeded in enhancing their efficiency”. Fu and Heffernan (2007) employ the
stochastic frontier approach for cost X-efficiency in China’s banking sector over
the period 1985-2002 and the results show that the joint-stock banks are found to
be more X-efficient than the state-owned commercial banks.
The conclusions of these studies are not always convergent: the reasons include
the divergences between methodologies, the difference of subjects, the huge het-
erogeneity in the internal management practices of banks and the external envi-
ronment.
Since the beginning of 21th century, many empirical analyses have been published
based on the efficiency of the Chinese banking industry. Wei and Wang (2000)
employ DEA analysis for the Chinese banks in 1997, finding that improve staff
quality, limiting the purchase of fixed assets and eliminate blind growth in loan-
able funds are the main ways to improve bank efficiency. Zhang (2003) use DEA
analysis and the improved Malmquist efficiency index model to estimate 41 Chi-
nese banks over the 1997-2001 period; the results show that joint-stock commercial
banks are more efficient than state-owned commercial banks, the improved inter-
nal management ability could improve the allocative efficiency of banks, and the
change in economic conditions and regulatory policy affect level of efficiency. Ac-
cording to Liu and Liu’s (2004) DFA analysis (distribution free approach of the
efficiency frontier analysis) for 14 commercial banks in China from 1996 to 2002,
the four big state-owned commercial banks have lower efficiency which is consistent
with research conclusion of Zhang (2003). Based on the study of Wu and Zhou
(2007), to maintain high level of efficiency, the state should be the largest share-
holder of the state-owned banks with the optimal holding ratio of 58% to 74%,
and for other commercial banks the holding ratio of the state should not exceed
10%. Yang and Zhang (2007) conduct DEA analysis for 14 Chinese commercial
banks over the 1996 -2005 period, and the result shows that the cost efficiency
and profit efficiency of joint-stock commercial banks are lower than those of state-
owned commercial banks.
Notwithstanding these works are devoted to scale efficiency, cost efficiency and
profit efficiency of commercial banks, there are only a few studies devoted to the
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total factor productivity change of the Chinese commercial banks. Malquist TFP
index, as a method for identifying productivity difference between firms over time,
has many advantages: it doesn’t require profit maximization, cost minimization,
information of the inputs and outputs price. Furthermore, the two decomposed
parts of the Malmquist TFP index help analysts to further understand the changes
of the efficiency. Consequently, it is a suitable method to evaluate the productivity
change of the banking industry. The rest of this chapter adopts this total factor
productivity to analyze the change of the Chinese commercial banks from year
1996 to year 2007 and to investigate the effect of the total factor productivity
change.
2.4 Methodology
There are two main methods to analyze the bank efficiency: (1) financial ratio
analysis and (2) frontier analysis. Frontier analysis could provide meaningful in-
sights in efficiency by considering the mix of service provided, which is beyond
those available from financial analysis (Sherman and Gold, 1985). Moreover, fi-
nancial ratio analysis could not offer a clear-cut rationale which would allow one
to acquire a composite score on the overall financial soundness of a bank, because
financial ratio analysis might use correlated variables or have index select error
(Yeh, 1996). Frontier analysis has twofold power: it not only permits researchers
with limited institutional background or experience to choose “best practice” insti-
tutions within the industry, but also consents individuals with sufficient institution
knowledge like managers to identify “best practice” area in considering of complex
service operations (Berger and Humphrey, 1997). The technique of the frontier
analysis is useful when we consider the situation with multiple inputs and out-
puts, some of whose prices cannot be observed (Hulten, 2000). Especially, frontier
analysis is particularly valuable in providing an overall, objectively determined,
numerical efficiency value, an analysis result not always possible with traditional
techniques. As a result, frontier analysis is now generally adopted to evaluate a
bank’s performance.
According to Berger and Humphrey’s (1997) survey of 130 studies that apply
frontier efficiency analysis to financial institutions in 21 countries, there are two
Chapter 2. Efficiency of China’s commercial banks: Malmquist total factor
productivity analysis 29
common approaches for the frontier analysis: Parametric frontier approach and
Non-parametric frontier approach.
Non-parametric approach is assumed that there is a consistency between measured
outputs/inputs and economic outputs/inputs, little structure on the specification
of the best-practice frontier, no measurement error, and no luck that temporar-
ily gives a decision making unit better measured performance on year from the
next. Non-parametric approach does not require the specification of the best
practice frontier and it is a distribution free method. Data Envelopment Analysis
(DEA), Free Disposed Hull approach (FDH) and Index Numbers (IN) belong to
Non-Parametric approach. Charnes, Cooper, and Rhodes (1978) developed DEA
analysis, which is a linear programming technique. The set of DEA best-practice
frontier are those by given certain outputs, there is no linear combination of unite
which has as little or less of every input or by given certain inputs; and there
is no other decision making unit which has as much or more of every output.
DEA analysis assumes a linear substitution between inputs, while FDH approach
presumes that no substitution is possible and has a step function formed input
combinations other than piecewise linear forms. FDH approach is a special case of
the DEA model and it generates larger estimates of average efficiency than DEA
approach. Isik, Ihsan and Kabir (2003) analyzed the Turkish banking efficiency by
using DEA analysis and Kirikal ( 2004) conducted DEA analysis for the Estonian
banking industry.
The parametric approach takes the residual term and specific functional form into
consideration. It includes Stochastic Frontier Approach (SFA), Thick Frontier Ap-
proach (TFA), Distribution Free Approach (DFA), and Recursive Thick Frontier
Approach (TRFA). Kraft and Tirtiroglu (1998) use SFA analysis for bank effi-
ciency in Croatia and the results show that new banks are less efficient but more
profitable than both old privatized banks and state banks. Fiorentino, Karmann,
and Koetter (2006) investigate the SFA analysis to analysis the efficiency of all
German universal banks between year 1993 and year 2004.
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2.4.1 Malmquist Total factor productivity index
Malmquist had earlier proposed constructing input quantity indexes as ratios of
distance functions (Malmquist, 1953), after that, Caves, Christensen, and Divert
(1982) firstly introduced Malmquist productivity index. A Malmquist productiv-
ity index, which is used to the comparison of relative productivity levels, could
be decomposed into economically relevant sources of productivity change (Fare,
Grifell-Tatje, Grosskopf and Lovell, 1997), for instance: a Malmquist productivity
index can be expressed as products of an index of technical change and an index
of technical efficiency change.
Fa¨re et al. (1994) denote that using suitable panel data the Malmquist TFP index
can be calculated applying a non-parametric DEA-like approach. More detailed,
we could use distance functions to define the Malmquist TFP index (Caves et al.,
1982 and Fa¨re et al., 1994).
Suppose at the time period t, the production set of technology is written as:
Pt = (xt, yt) (2.1)
Where xt ∈ R+ and yt ∈ R+. Over the time period t, (t = 1, . . . , T ), input vector
is xt, and output vector is yt. We can produce yt outputs by using xt inputs.
Then at time t, the output distance function can be defined as:
dtc(xt, yt) = Inf{θ : (xt, yt/θ) ∈ Pt} (2.2)
Where, the subscript c denotes constant returns to scale technology as before. If
dtc(xt, yt) ≤ 1 , the observation (xt, yt) belongs to the production set Pt.
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Moreover, at time t+1, the output distance function can be defined as:
dt+1c (xt+1, yt+1) = Inf{θ : (xt+1, yt+1/θ) ∈ Pt+1} (2.3)
To calculate the Malmquist TFP index, there are two more distance functions
need to be defined:
(1) The distance of production (xt, yt) related to the technology at time period
t+ 1 and Pt+1:
dt+1c (xt, yt) = Inf{θ : (xt, yt/θ) ∈ Pt+1} (2.4)
(2) The distance of production (xt+1, yt+1) related to the technology at time period
t and Pt:
dtc(xt+1, yt+1) = Inf{θ : (xt+1, yt+1/θ) ∈ Pt} (2.5)
According to Caves, Christensen, and Divert (1982), the period t total factor
productivity index could be represented as equation 6 which measures the produc-
tivity change from period t observations to period t+1 observations using period
t technology as a benchmark.
M to(xt+1, yt+1, xt, yt) =
dtc(xt+1, yt+1)
dtc(xt, yt)
(2.6)
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Where, the subscript ”o” denotes that the productivity change follows an output-
oriented measure.
Deduced by analogy, equation 7 below is the period t+ 1 total factor productivity
index which measures the productivity change from period t observations to pe-
riod t+ 1 observations using period t+1 technology as a benchmark.
M t+1o (xt+1, yt+1, xt, yt) =
dt+1c (xt+1, yt+1)
dt+1c (xt, yt)
(2.7)
The geometric mean of two total factor productivity indexes is Malmquist pro-
ductivity index. Malmquist productivity index, shown as equation 2.8, measures
the total factor productivity change between time period t (the base period) to
period t+ 1.
M t,t+1o (xt+1, yt+1, xt, yt) = [
dtc(xt+1, yt+1)
dtc(xt, yt)
× d
t+1
c (xt+1, yt+1)
dt+1c (xt, yt)
]1/2 (2.8)
If the value M is greater than one, there is a positive growth of productivity; if
the value M is equal to one, the productivity is unchanged; while if the value M
is smaller than one, there is a decline of productivity.
Moreover, the Malmquist productivity index can be decomposed into two compo-
nents as in equation 2.9. The first component TEC measures the change of the
technical efficiency between time period t and period t+ 1. If TEC > 1, it means
the producer is moving closer to the production frontier, there are improvements
on efficiency; if TEC < 1, it implies the producer is diverging from the production
frontier; and TEC = 1, it shows the technical efficiency of producer is unchanged.
The second component TECP indicates the technical change in the production
technology. The TECP > 1 when technological best practice is improving; the
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TECP = 1 when technological best practice is unchanged, and the TECP < 1
when technological best practice is degrading.
M t,t+1c (xt+1, yt+1, xt, yt) =
dt+1c (xt+1, yt+1)
dtc(xt, yt)︸ ︷︷ ︸
TEC
×[ d
t
c(xt+1, yt+1)
dt+1c (xt+1, yt+1)
× d
t
c(xt, yt)
dt+1c (xt, yt)
]1/2︸ ︷︷ ︸
TECP
(2.9)
Furthermore, assuming constant returns to scale and variable returns to scale, the
TEC component can be decomposed into two components: PTEC (the change
of the pure technical efficiency) and SEC (the change of the scale efficiency) as
formula 10.
M t,t+1v,c (xt+1, yt+1, xt, yt) =
dt+1v (xt+1, yt+1)
dtv(xt, yt)︸ ︷︷ ︸
PTEC
×[d
t
v(xt, yt)
dtc(xt, yt)
/
dt+1v (xt+1, yt+1)
dt+1c (xt+1, yt+1)
]1/2︸ ︷︷ ︸
SEC
×
[
dtc(xt+1, yt+1)
dt+1c (xt+1, yt+1)
× d
t
c(xt, yt)
dt+1c (xt, yt)
]1/2
(2.10)
Where, the subscript v denotes variable returns to scale technology.
2.5 Data, input and output definitions
Many authors applied DEA analysis to measure the efficiency of banks. They
used different inputs and outputs (see Floyd, Lovell, Yaisawarng, 1999, and Ven-
net, 2002). There are two main approaches to define the inputs and outputs of
a bank: the production approach and the intermediation approach. Under the
production approach, bank is the provider of deposit and loan. It employs capital
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and labor to produce deposit and loan service. The inputs are capital and labor.
The outputs are the business volume which presents as the amount of deposit and
loans, or quantity of service banks provide. The intermediation approach considers
the bank as an intermediary agency. Banks collect residual capital and provide
capital to others. Therefore, the outputs are the amount of total loans and interest
income, whereas deposits are defined inputs.
For the production approach, Berger and Humphrey (1997) indicate that it is
recommended for analyzing the performance of banks whose managers do not
have much control on the financing mix. According to Sathye (2001), Berger and
Humphrey (1997), the intermediation approach is more relevant and suitable for
analyzing financial institutions. The intermediation approach has become dom-
inant to estimate the performance of the whole banking industry, because “it is
better suited to capture the decisions taken to minimize the cost of the financing
mix” (Mario and Andre´, 2007).
In this paper, I use the intermediation approach to analyze the Chinese banking
industry. By considering the bank as a multi-product organization, I model my
target Chinese banks as multiproduct firms which use deposit (x1) and total as-
set (x2) as inputs to produce as outputs, loan (y1) and operating income (y2). I
analysis these 14 Chinese banks by employing 2 inputs and produce 2 outputs.
For the empirical analysis, I consider annual data (for the 1998-2007 periods) for
each of the 4 state-owned commercial banks (SOB) and 10 joint-stock commercial
banks (JSB) as the Table 3.1. There are 140 observations. The main source of
data for the present study is the Almanac of China’s Finance and Banking, China
Statistic Yearbook, and banks’ annual reports.
The TABLE 3.2 below supplies the summary of descriptive statistic (the mean,
max and min value, standard deviation and number of observations) for all vari-
ables used for Malmquist total factor productivity index for ten years.
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Table 2.1: List of Chinese Banks
No. Bank Type
1 The Industrial and Commercial Bank of China SOB
2 The Agricultural Bank of China SOB
3 Bank of China Co., Ltd SOB
4 China Construction Bank Corporation SOB
5 Bank of Communications Co., Ltd JSB
6 China CITIC Bank Corporation Ltd JSB
7 China Everbright Bank Co., Ltd JSB
8 Hua Xia Bank Co., Ltd JSB
9 China Minsheng Banking Corporation JSB
10 Guangdong Development Bank Co., Ltd JSB
11 Shenzhen Development Bank Co., Ltd JSB
12 China Merchants Bank Co., Ltd JSB
13 Industrial Bank Co., Ltd JSB
14 Shanghai Pudong Development Bank JSB
Table 2.2: Data feature description (monetary unit: a hundred million Yuan)
Description Loan Operating income Deposit Total assets
Variables y1 y2 x1 x2
Maximum value 39575,42 2541,57 68984,13 86842,88
Minimum value 111,00 11,20 179,78 252,35
Median 2741,42 156,74 3870,32 4939,08
Standard deviation 10310,14 588,90 15733,50 18961,13
Number of observed value 140 140 140 140
2.6 Results
Based on the statistics of 14 Chinese commercial banks, I use a data envelopment
analysis computer program DEAP (see Coelli, 1996 for a general presentation of
this program), to calculate Malmquist total factor productivity indexes for the
time period 1998 to 2007. Resti (1997), Rao and Battase (1998), Ihsan and Kabir
(2003), Coelli and Kirikal (2004) used already the computer program DEAP to
provide analyses of the banking industry.
The TABLE 3.3 summarizes the productivity change result, that is, the evolution
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Table 2.3: Malmquist Index Summary Annual Means
Year TEC TECP PTEC SEC TFPC
1998–1999 1,029 1,310 1,008 1,021 1,348
1999–2000 0,829 1,318 0,899 0,922 1,093
2000–2001 1,152 0,699 1,163 0,990 0,805
2001–2002 0,869 1,425 0,969 0,897 1,237
2002–2003 0,945 0,921 0,961 0,983 0,870
2003–2004 0,817 0,988 0,916 0,892 0,808
2004–2005 1,142 0,894 1,006 1,135 1,021
2005–2006 1,183 1,379 1,012 1,168 1,630
2006–2007 1,006 1,002 1,089 0,924 1,008
Geometric mean 0,988 1,076 1,000 0,988 1,063
1998–2007 0,896 1,933 0,997 0,898 1,730
of the technical efficiency change (TEC), technical change in the production tech-
nology (TECP), pure technical efficiency change (PTEC), scale efficiency change
(SEC) and Malmquist total factor productivity change (TFPC).1.
The results of TABLE 3.3 suggest that Chinese commercial banks experienced
an average of 6.3% annual productivity growth rate (Geometric mean2 TFPC -
1) during year 1998 to year 2007, a total of 73% (1998 2007 TFPC - 1) for the
period. Productivity increase is mainly the result of a 7.6% per year of technology
progress (93.3% for the period). The geometric mean of TEC which show the
“catching - up effect” is negative at -0.2% per year (- 10.4% for the period). This
negative behavior of TEC is mainly due to the poor results of the “catching-up
effect” from year 2001 to year 2004. By decomposing the index TEC into PTEC
and SEC, we could see that the decrease of SEC has more effect on the decline of
TEC than PTEC.
From the FIGURE 3.1, it is clear that the movement of TFPC follows the evolu-
tions of TECP. Improvement of the technological best practice offsets the negative
“catching-up” effect. From the FIGURE 3.2, the movement of TEC is similar
evolutions of SEC. SEC has stranger effect for the trend of TEC than PTEC.
1Recall that: TFPC = TEC × TECP = PTEC × SEC × TECP
2The values of 1998–2007 indexes are obtained by using geometric mean to the ninth power.
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Figure 2.1: Movement of TEC, TECP and TFCP.
 
Figure 2.2: Movement of TEC, PTEC and SEC.
 
TABLE 3.4 shows productivity scores by different banks. Except the Industrial
and Commercial Bank of China Ltd and China CITIC Bank Corporation Ltd, all
other Chinese commercial banks have positive productivity growth (TFPC > 1)
regardless of bank size. The mainly reason for this positive result is thanks to the
technological progress (TECP > 1). Other than the China CITIC Bank Corpora-
tion Ltd and Industrial Bank Co., Ltd, other 12 Chinese commercial banks show
the technological improvement (TECP > 1). The Agricultural Bank of China,
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Table 2.4: Malmquist Index Summary of Banks Means
No. Bank TEC TECP PTEC SEC TFPC
1 The Industrial and Commercial Bank of China 0,934 1,010 1,000 0,934 0,943
2 The Agricultural Bank of China 1,005 1,047 1,005 1,000 1,052
3 Bank of China Co., Ltd 0,976 1,150 1,045 0,934 1,122
4 China Construction Bank Corporation 0,974 1,033 1,026 0,949 1,006
5 Bank of Communications Co., Ltd 0,971 1,075 0,955 1,017 1,044
6 China CITIC Bank Corporation Ltd 0,993 0,998 0,984 1,009 0,991
7 China Everbright Bank Co., Ltd 0,975 1,116 0,978 0,997 1,088
8 Hua Xia Bank Co., Ltd 0,995 1,023 1,000 0,995 1,018
9 China Minsheng Banking Corporation 1,025 1,329 1,000 1,025 1,362
10 Guangdong Development Bank Co., Ltd 1,018 1,172 1,013 1,005 1,194
11 Shenzhen Development Bank Co., Ltd 0,968 1,102 1,000 0,968 1,067
12 China Merchants Bank Co., Ltd 0,961 1,050 0,959 1,002 1,009
13 Industrial Bank Co., Ltd 1,034 0,997 1,031 1,002 1,010
14 Shanghai Pudong Development Bank 1,008 1,003 1,005 1,002 1,010
Geometric mean 0,988 1,076 1,000 0,988 1,061
Figure 2.3: Productivity scorse of banks.
 
the China Minsheng Banking Corporation, the Guangdong Development Bank
Co., Ltd, the Industrial Bank Co., Ltd and the Shanghai Pudong Development
Bank Co., Ltd have TEC bigger than 1, which represent these banks have best
practice. While other banks (whose TEC < 1) practice close to the efficient pro-
duction frontier.
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The China Minsheng Banking Corporation experiences the highest productivity
(36.2% average annual) and has the best technological change (32.9% average an-
nual) for the period. While the Industrial and Commercial Bank of China Ltd, as
one of the “big 4” banks in China, has the lowest productivity because of the bad
scale efficiency change.
2.7 Regression analysis
The purpose of the total factor productivity change analysis is not only to make
value measurement, but also to reveal the determinants of the TFPC. Bank man-
agers could pay more attention to improve these determinants, and ultimately
enhance the TFPC of banks. In order to well understand the efficiency change of
the Chinese banking industry, I continued my researches. I conducted regression
analysis to disclose the interior regularity of the Chinese banking industry.
2.7.1 Marco-approach regression model
Dependent variable is Total factor productivity change index. Five independent
variables are GDP growth rate,inflation rate, M23 and HHI index of loan and HHI
index 4of deposit.
Macro-approach regression model is shown as below:
TFPCt = α1 +α2×GDPt+α3×CPIt+α4×M2t+α5×MCLt+α6×MCDt+t
(2.11)
Where TFPCt is annual total factor productivity change for year t, GDPt repre-
sents GDP growth rate for year t, INFt denotes consumer price index for year t,
3M2 is used to quantify the amount of money in circulation and explain different economic
monetary conditions.
4HHI is Herfindahl-Hirschman Index which represents market competition. It is defined as
the sum of the squares of the market shares of all firms within the industry. Here, I calculated
HHI for the loan market and deposit market respectively of the banking industry.
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M2t is M2 money supply growth rate for year t, MCLt and MCDt expresses HHI
of loan and HHI of deposit respectively for year t.
I used STATA software to perform regression analysis. The results of Macro-
approach model are as below:
Figure 2.4: Results of Macro- approach model
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      Source         SS       df       MS              Number of obs =       9
So, the standardized regression equation is5:
TFPC = 1.277896GDP−1.521989INF−0.5727074M2−0.3773177MCL+0.0105845MCD
(2.12)
High GDP growth rate indicates a sound macro-economic environment which fa-
cilitates banks’ operation and encourages banks’ innovation. From my macro
regression analysis, the beta value of GDP is 1.277896, and statistic t-test is sig-
nificant. Results show that GDP growth rate have remarkable positive influence
on commercial banks’ TFPC. Certain level of GDP growth could improve the ef-
ficiency of Chinese banking industry.
Inflation has been a double-edge sword. It leads not only higher costs but also
higher income. The treatment of revaluation gains on the fixed assets and trade
investment of bank would affect the impact of inflation for banks’ operation result.
From my macro regression analysis, the beta value of inflation is -1.521989, and
5For the test of significant: result of INF variable is significant beyond the 5% level, and
result of GDP variable is significant beyond the 10% level.
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statistic t-test is significant. Inflation has remarkable negative influence on Chinese
commercial banks’ TFPC. Chinese banks could change their financial structure of
asset and liability to benefit from inflation, such as increasing their noninterest
bearing liabilities or decreasing their noninterest assets.
Moreover, market competition index of deposit have positive influence on commer-
cial banks’ TFPC. While M2 growth rate and market competition index of loan
have negative influence on commercial banks’ TFPC. The statistic t-test for these
three variables is not significant.
Chinese banking industry need a stable and sustainable macroeconomic environ-
ment. China’s policy makers should pay attention to retain appropriate level of
GDP growth rate and inflation rate. Bank managers should be concerned about
internal management of banks: for instance, modifying asset allocation, making
good service innovation, attracting more deposit, reducing non-performance loans
and etc.
2.8 Conclusion of the Chapter 2
Applying a non-parametric Malquist TFP index method, this paper attempts to
investigate the efficiency change of the Chinese banking industry during the time
period of year 1998 to year 2007. The performance of banks is crucial for the
whole economy, and many researchers conduct Malquist TFP index method to
analyze performance of banking industry. Malquist TFP index is a method for
identifying productivity difference between firms over time. Moreover, it is one of
the best methods to analyze the banks with multi-inputs and multi-outputs. In
order to realize this objective, I use Malmquist TFP index, TEC , TECP , and two
decomposed components PTEC and SEC6 to measure the productivity difference
between 14 Chinese commercial banks for the time period 1998 to 2007.
6Recall that: TEC = the change of the technical efficiency, TECP = technical change in the
production technology, PTEC = the change of the pure technical efficiency, SEC = the change
of the scale efficiency
Chapter 2. Efficiency of China’s commercial banks: Malmquist total factor
productivity analysis 42
Comparing the results over the period of 1998–2007, the highest productivity
growth was from 2005 to 2006. The productivity decreased during the period
2002–2004. These 14 Chinese commercial banks that we considered in this paper
experienced average of 6.3% annual productivity growth rate during 1998–2007.
Table 3.4 shows that 12 of 14 banks have TECP bigger than 1, while only 5 of
the 14 banks have TEC bigger than 1. Therefore Technology progress (PTEC)
is the main reason for the improvement of productivity (Malmquist TFP index),
although the technical efficiency change is not so good. Generally speaking, via
computers, screen-based trading and the widely use of automated teller machines
(ATMS), the technological improvement could have helped banks increase income
and reduce cost.
Looking at different banks over the period 1998–2007, we can conclude that the
Chinese commercial banks have been able to experience technological progress
and productivity improvement. The Industrial and Commercial Bank of China
Ltd, the Agricultural Bank of China, the Bank of China Co., Ltd and the China
Construction Bank Corporation are the four biggest commercial banks in China.
However, the results of my analysis indicate that these biggest banks do not have
the best performance. Based on the table 3, 3 of the “big 4” banks have SEC
smaller than 1. The “big 4” banks’ geometric mean of SEC is smaller than the
joint-stock commercial banks’ geometric mean of SEC, even though “big 4” banks
have larger scale. Consequently, bigger scale did not help four big banks improve
their scale efficiency. The poor internal management, low quality of service, huge
non-performing loans and government intervention are probably the main reason
of the scale inefficiency in the Chinese banking industry especially for the “big 4”
banks. Generally, the 10 joint-stock commercial banks have better performance
of the scale efficiency change than “big 4” banks. The China Minsheng Banking
Corporation and Guangdong Development Bank Co., Ltd have for instance the
top two highest productivity progresses.
For the regression analysis, a sound macro-economic environment and a well in-
ternal structured banking system is important for the Chinese commercial banks.
Chinese government should keep the appropriate level of GDP growth rate, design
good monetary and banking policy, and control the inflation. Bank managers need
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to continue optimizing their bank structure and internal operational processes.
Chapter 3
Foreign Bank Investment In
Emerging Countries: a theoretical
model
3.1 Introduction to Chapter 3
In recent years, many emerging countries have introduced reforms of their financial
industries, ranging from encouraging the emergence of new private banks to open-
ing access to Merger and Acquisition (M&A) activity involving domestic banks.
However, allowing more competition in the financial industry is a complex issue
since it involves structural reforms in the domestic financial sector and has impli-
cations for macroeconomic stability.
The processes of development and liberalization have allowed foreign banks to in-
crease their presence in emerging countries by opening representative offices, new
branches, or sub-branches, through the acquisition of minority ownership stakes
in domestic banks, or by setting up new local incorporations. The entry of for-
eign banks has provoked structural changes in the emerging banking markets and
is forcing domestic banks to become more competitive. In this paper, we assess
these effects.
44
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The specialist literature argues that foreign bank entrants into emerging markets
improve the efficiency and performance of the acquired institutions, and more gen-
erally enhance local financial stability. However, foreign bank entry can also have
a negative effect on emerging markets. It can result in “cream skimming”, in the
sense that reputable foreign banks are able to attract high profile clients from the
domestic banks. This effect is prompting action by national authorities to limit or
control foreign entry. To what extent are these actions justified? In which cases
does the “cream-skimming” effect outweigh the advantages expected from foreign
bank entry? This paper addresses these questions applying a theoretical model.
We focus on the cases where domestic rules limit foreign entry to new branches
and minority shareholdings and limited management involvement of foreign banks
in domestic banks. We analyze how foreign banks expand in emerging banking
markets through these three different entry modes, and whether minority foreign
ownership improves the efficiency of the domestic banks. We focus particularly
on the case of entry by a M&A between a local bank (local banks) and a for-
eign bank. In contrast to establishment of a new bank branch, M&A activity
can indeed provide opportunities for cooperation between the partners, can ac-
celerate the diffusion of more efficient management practices from the foreign to
the domestic partner(s), and can allow access soft information for the foreign bank.
Section 3.2 reviews the literature on M&A activities in the banking industry, and
changes in banks’ efficiency change follow a M&A. Section3.3 presents the assump-
tions and the first results of a theoretical model analyzing three entry modes of
entry of a foreign bank. This theoretical model shows that, if the credit mar-
ket initially is not covered, foreign bank entry always increases total distributed
credit. If the cream-skimming effect is not too strong, it will be positive also for
the domestic banking sector. If entry is via M&A activity with a domestic bank(s),
the effect on the distribution of credit and the profit of the banking industry will
be positive. However, there are some negative effects associated with these pos-
itive ones. A reduced number of domestic shareholders (or a decreasing share of
domestic ownership in the capital of domestic banks) decreases their aggregated
profit and the possibility of control of the domestic banking industry by domestic
managers. Section 3.4 analyzes the regulatory rules that might be introduced by
a domestic authority in order to impose appropriate limitations on entry. We find
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that if foreign bank entry is by establishment of a new subsidiary, and if the for-
eign bank has a sufficiently good access to international money markets resources,
the positive effects dominate the negative effects for the domestic sector. We also
find that limiting the share of the foreign bank in the capital of the domestic bank
can be more or less justified according to the balance struck by the domestic au-
thorities between the wealth of the initial and future shareholders in the domestic
banks. Section 3.5 provides a discussion and conclusion.
3.2 M&A in the banking industry, and foreign
bank entry in developing countries
3.2.1 M&A activities in the banking industry
M&As are one of the most important ways to finance services developments. They
correspond to the purchase of whole companies or the shares of companies by an-
other company (Ahern. and Weston, 2007). They frequently from part of a growth
strategy (Yang and Hyland, 2006).
From the beginning of the 19th century, various waves of M&As have contributed
to progressive changes in the topography of the banking industry. According to Li
(2003), in the 1950s decade, some 1,000 M&As occurred in the financial industry,
with a total value of around $U.S.50 billion. In subsequent decades, the number of
M&As in the banking industry continued to increase: for instance, in 1995 there
were 4100 M&A activities in the banking sector, and in 1996 this number was
4,200. After 1997, M&As in the banking industry continued to grow in the U.S.
and in Europe, Asia, and Latin America.
At the end of the last century, M&A activities in the financial industry began to
take a new form, and especially in the banking industry. The trend is now towards
M&As involving banks in different countries, either developed or emerging. These
new tpyes of M&A are having an impact on both the banking industry and also
on the global economy. Globalization is stimulating the growth of international
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companies which need more financial services. Many banks have been involved in
M&A activities in order to expand their scales of operation, increase their capital,
and improve their competitive power and ability to withstand risk. In the most
recent years, the deregulation of markets and the globalization of economies have
had a major effect on banks’ M&A activity, and the 2007-2008 crisis showed that
M&A was a strategy that might allow survival during the financial crisis.
3.2.1.1 M&A activities in the banking industry of developed countries
The most recent wave of M&A activity in the banking industry began in the early
1990s and has continued to the present time, continuously fueled by new local or
generalized financial crises. The movement began in the U.S. and spread to the
rest of the world. The U.S. banking industry deployed M&A activity on a large
scale to maintain their dominance throughout the world. For example, in 1998,
Citicorp and Travelers Group merged to form Citigroup which became the biggest
financial service company at that time; First Chicago NBD Corp. merged to form
Bank One Corp, the then fifth biggest bank in U.S.; the 3rd ranked U.S. bank
- NationsBank Corp.- and the fourth US bank - BankAmerica Corp.- merged to
form the Bank of America Corp. which became the second largest U.S. Bank.
European countries were spurred by the U.S. M&A banking industry wave. For
instance: in 1998, Deutsche Bank bought Bankers Trust making it the largest
financial institution in the world at that time. Spain, France, Switzerland, Fin-
land and other European countries embarked on M&A activities in their banking
industries. M&A activity in the European banking industry enabled European
countries to be more internationally competitive.
Santilla`n-Salgado (2005) points out that the U.S. banking industry suffered a dra-
matic compacting process that reduced the number of banks by half; while Europe
experienced a less profound, but intense reduction in the number of banking insti-
tutions. Hagendorff, Collins and Keasey (2007) analyze this trend in U.S., Italy
and Germany, and the relationship between changes in regulation and M&A ac-
tivities in these countries from the end of the 1990s.
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3.2.1.2 M&A activities in the banking industries of developing coun-
tries
Driven by a spate of M&A activities between foreign developed countries’ institu-
tions and developing countries’ banks, foreign investment increased in the emerging
market banking sectors since in the second half of the 1900s (Soussa, 2004). There
are six main determinants of banks’ foreign direct investment in emerging market
economies: “(1) shifts in regulatory opportunity and environment; (2) increased
economic integration between home and host countries; (3) information costs; (4)
profit opportunities; (5) factors relevant to specific institutions; and (6) factors
relevant to the home markets of acquiring institutions” (Soussa, 2004). All these
motivations have been at play in the last decade. Using firm-level data for five
East Asian countries over the period 1981-2001, Aguiar and Gopinath (2005) ob-
serve that the liquidity crunch increased foreign investment in the form of M&A
activity in emerging markets. Kamaly (2007) points out that, for developing coun-
tries, the degree of market openness has a significant effect on M&A activity but
that depreciation in the domestic exchange rate positively affects M&A activity,
and high levels of stock market activities may reduce M&A activity.
3.2.2 Bank efficiency
3.2.2.1 Bank efficiency in developing countries
In developing countries, foreign banks seem to operate more efficiently than domes-
tic banks. Thus, the new entrants improve the efficiency not only of the domestic
banks but also of the whole banking industry. Analysis of the Colombian case in
the late 1990s shows that the entry of foreign banks in the capital of domestic banks
improved domestic bank behavior by enhancing operative efficiency and competi-
tion, although thess improvements came at the expense of losses in loan market
for the domestic banks (Barajas, Steiner, and Salazar, 1999). Farnoux, Lanteri,
and Schmidt (2004), in a study of Poland, show that foreign banks conducted
M&As with Polish banks which played a key role in banking system restructur-
ing, created an efficient banking system, and improved the efficiency of the Polish
banking sector. Coppel and Davies (2003) analyzed foreign participation in the
banking sectors of East Asian economies and find that in spite of “the presence of
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foreign banks in East Asia is low compared with the emerging market economies
of Latin America and Eastern Europe”. At the same time, the level of foreign
involvement in the banking industry has increased, foreign entry has strengthened
institutional and governance arrangements in the banking sector, facilitated the
transfer of technology, and promoted financial development.
3.2.2.2 Some negative impacst of foreign bank entry in developing
countries
Claessens, Demirfu¨c¸-Kunt, and Huizinga (2000) show that foreign banks in de-
veloping countries tend to have higher profitability and interest margins than
domestic banks. This situation is unacceptable in the long run since it leaves the
domestic banks with greater involvement in less profitable operations than the for-
eign entrants which choose only the more profitable ventures. Foreign bank entry
can force the domestic market to start operating more efficiently by increasing
competition. In the best cases, this stronger competition increases the number
of competitors and services, and decreases their respective prices which increases
customer satisfaction and consumers’ welfare.
However, the entry of foreign banks can have several negative impacts for devel-
oping countries. Claessens, Demirfu¨c¸-Kunt, and Huizinga (2001) provide evidence
that, for most countries, larger foreign ownership of banks is associated with re-
duced domestic bank profitability and lower margins among domestic banks. The
relaxation of restrictions on foreign bank entry can be counter-productive for the
development of the domestic financial system. Given the experience of some coun-
tries and the likely development of Chinese banking, Bonin and Huang (2002)
observe that, in most cases, foreign banks compete with domestic banks for prof-
itable corporate clients and wealthy retail clients. In the long run, high-profile
profitable clients obtain full access to international opportunities through the ser-
vice of foreign banks while the opportunities of other clients do not improve. In
addition, although domestic banks have informational advantages and well estab-
lished client relationships, foreign banks can attract these clients with competitive
pricing.
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Clarke, Cull, Martinez Peria (2006) combine the responses from a survey of about
3000 enterprises in 35 developing and transition economies with data on foreign
bank participation, and estimate that the latter can reduce access to credit, espe-
cially for some sectors of the economy such as small and medium-sized enterprises
(SMEs). They show further that reduced access to credit for these firms can have
a considerable negative impact on the overall economy in many developing coun-
tries. Analyzing the entry of foreign banks to India during the 1990s, Gormley
(2007) finds that, on entry, foreign banks financed only a small set of very prof-
itable firms. In India, firms on average were 8 percentage points less likely to
obtain a loan after foreign bank entry, and foreign bank entry led to a systematic
drop in domestic bank loans. They observe also that, although there are many
potential benefits from foreign bank entry, information asymmetries may prevent
firms in developing countries from realizing these benefits. For all these reasons,
policymakers should fine-tune their market liberalization policies.
Detragiache, Tressel, and Gupta (2008) propose a theoretical model to show that
foreign bank entry results in a cream-skimming effect which increases overall op-
erating costs and lowers aggregate welfare; they suggest that domestic banks are
better than foreign banks at monitoring soft information, and show that foreign
bank entry benefits only the more transparent firms leaving other firms either
o beter off or worse off. Similarly, Lensink, Meesters, Naaborg (2008) conduct
stochastic frontier analysis to 2,095 commercial banks in 105 countries for the
years 1998-2003, and show that foreign ownership has a negative effect on bank
efficiency and that domestic banks may have informational advantages relative to
foreign banks.
These results provide a contrasting vision of the effects of foreign banks entry
to the domestic banking market of emerging countries. Below we analyze these
contrasts within a micro-founded framework that includes different entry condi-
tions. The model integrates two aspects discussed in the M&A literature on the
banking industry in developing countries. First, entry of foreign banks improves
management methods and practices and opens the way for the international mar-
ket to fund a part of domestic loans. Second, the cooperation between domestic
and foreign teams enables diffusion of soft information previously available only
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to the domestic banks. Also, in an uncovered loan market, it integrates the indi-
rect effects exerted by foreign banks on economic activity through an increase in
deposits generated by traditional lending. We find that if foreign bank entry is via
the creation of a new subsidiary, the positive effects dominate the bad negative
effects if the foreign bank has a sufficiently good access to international money
market resources. We find also that the limitation imposed on the shares of for-
eign banks in the capital of domestic banks depends on the balance struck by the
domestic authorities between the wealth of the initial and future shareholders in
the domestic banks.
3.3 The analytical model
Our benchmark model depicts banking industry interactions before foreign bank
entry to the domestic market. We then analyze the consequences of the entry of
three modes of entry for a single foreign bank: establishing a new branch (subsec-
tion 3.3.2), taking a minority share in a large traditional bank (subsection 3.3.3),
and taking minority shares in smaller specialized banks (subsection 3.3.4). In each
case, we analyze the stationary equilibrium of the banking industry, and consider
the conditions under which entry provides advantages to each partner.
3.3.1 The benchmark model
The domestic banking industry initially includes by two categories of banks: a large
traditional State-Owned-Bank (SOB) with branches throughout the country, long
operating experience, and very close contacts and relations with its clients; and m
small specialized Joint-Stock-Banks (JSBs) with branches in certain regions of the
country, that provide specialized services and products and have shorter operating
experience (with m 1).
All domestic banks provide financial intermediation services in the form of loans
and deposits. The banks’ profits are the difference between the gross return on the
loans and the different financial and management costs to the banks are submitted.
These profits depend on the bank size, their financial and managerial efficiency
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and their interactions. They depend also on the nature of the demand for loans.
We suppose that there are two categories of unitary loans: high category loans
have a low level of risk/large expected returns and normal loans have a higher level
of risk/smaller expected returns. All banks are able to recognize the category of
a given loan. The markets of high category loans is driven by demand and always
covered. In this segment, ys borrowers choose to borrow from the SOB and yj
from each JSB. Their chosen bank recognizes and accepts high category loans.
Borrowers of good loans are served first by the banks which complement their
offer of credit by selecting a part of the available demand for normal loans. While
high category loans are all served, only a fraction of the demand for normal loans
is exhausted.
3.3.1.1 The individual determinants of banks profits
The profits made by the banks on normal loans depends on three factors:
(i) While all banks have the same ability to recognize high category loans all things
being equal, their level of “soft information” determines their “financial efficiency”
and the level of the returns they can expect from a normal loan. Given its long
operating experience, its large number of branches and its capacity for observa-
tion, the SOB has an advantage over the JSBs related to the identification of good
loans in the category of normal loans.
(ii) “managerial efficiency”, i.e. the capacity to save human, material, and imma-
terial inputs in the search for opportunities, in the selection, and in the overall
management of loans. This cost component introduces an advantage for JSBs
whose management practices are rationalized, with less and more efficient em-
ployees and up-to-date technologies.
(iii) “state of affairs”, which is a partly exogenous factor depending on business cy-
cle and technological shocks. It is also partly endogenous to the banking industry.
The stimulating effect of an autonomous increase in loans generates new deposits,
saves refinancing costs for the banks, and attracts new business. The result is that,
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in a non-covered market, an autonomous increase in loans increases the volume of
activity, generates new business, eases observation of loans, increases their returns,
and decreases their risk. The resulting strategic complementarities between banks
can generate cross-positive or negative effects between the decisions of the SOB
and JSBs.
To simplify the model we represent the effect (i) as a receipt advantage for the
SOB and (ii) as a cost advantage for the JSBs. The effect (iii) is represented by
its positive influence on the receipts of both categories of banks.
3.3.1.2 The benchmark case
If xs and xj represent respectively the amounts of unitary normal loans distributed
respectively by the SOB and JSBs, and ys and yj present the given numbers of
high category loans administrated by each category of banks, xs and xj maximize
respectively the profits of SOB and JSBs given by the expressions (3.1) and (3.2):
pis(xs) = (αsA
e + α¯s)(fsxs + ys)− 1
ts
(xs + ys)
2 (3.1)
pij(xj) = (αjA
e + α¯j)(fjxj + yj)− 1
tj
(xj + yj)
2 (3.2)
where:
- fs, (0 ≤ fs < 1) and fj, (0 ≤ fj < 1), with fs ≥ fj, represent the financial
efficiency components of the receipts of the two categories of banks on normal
loans,
- ts, (0 ≤ ts < 1) and tj, (0 ≤ tj < 1), with ts ≤ tj, represent the technological
efficiency components of the costs to the two categories of banks,
- Ae figures the expected endogenous component of the level of activity determined
by the total amount of loans distributed by the banking industry,
- αs and αj (0 < αj < αs < 1) express the weight of strategic complementaries
among banks on deposits and the observation of new opportunities for loans. The
size effect (JSBs have a small number of branches when compared to the SOB)
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explains the difference in the magnitudes of these parameters.
- α¯s and α¯j (0 < α¯j < αs) are positive and constant parameters reflecting the size
effect when there are no strategic complementarity effects.
The effective value A of Ae is given by (3.3):
A = (xs + ys) +m(xj + yj) (3.3)
3.3.1.3 Stationary equilibrium in the benchmark case
A stationary equilibrium is a triplet (A∗, x∗s, x
∗
j) with two properties:
• The number of normal loans (x∗s, x∗j) funded by each category of bank solves
equations (3.1) and (3.2) given an expected level of activity Ae = A∗,
• The effective level of activity A given by expression (3.3) is perfectly ex-
pected, i.e. A = A∗
Using the simplified notations b = fstsα¯s+mfjtjα¯j > 0 and b
′ = fstsαs+mfjtjαj >
0, we can then deduce Lemma 3.1
Lemma 3.1. When b′ < 2, there exists one single stationary equilibrium for the
benchmark model, such that A∗ = b/(2 − b′), x∗s = 12fsts( b2−b′αs + α¯s) − ys and
x∗j =
1
2
fjtj(
b
2−b′αj + α¯j)− yj. This equilibrium is stable under the same condition
b′ < 2.
Proof : see Appendix A.
The condition b′ < 2 can be commented. The terms αs and mαj capture the direct
induced effect of the activity of all banks on the activity of a single category of
bank. In the same way that it is not reasonable to suppose that this direct induced
effect on the SOB could be bigger than 1, it is also not reasonable to suppose that
the induced effect of the activity of all banks on the activity of all JSB could be
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bigger than 1. Otherwise, bank activity of could increase exponentially, and with-
out limits, from an initial autonomous impulse: in this case, there is obviously no
stationary equilibrium. Supposing that αs and mαj are smaller than 1 is then the
same as supposing that the credit multiplier is a finite number. Condition b < 2
then introduces no unusual restrictions in the conditions of existence and stability
of a stationary equilibrium in the banking system.
Static comparative analysis of the stationary equilibrium values of variables {A∗, x∗s, x∗j}
confirms these intuitions. While each category of bank increases its distribution of
loans and its profits through an increase in its financial and technological efficiency,
improvements to the efficiency of each category of bank provides cross-positive ef-
fects on the other category. Given that the loans distributed by each category of
bank have an indirect positive effect on all banks, an increase in the efficiency of
one category of bank has two effects:
• a direct positive effect only on the returns for the category of bank that
experiences it;
• an indirect positive effect on the returns of all banks, as a result of an
improvement to the “state of affairs”.
We can summarize these observations in the following proposition:
Proposition 3.2. When it does not change the distribution of high quality loans
among banks, all improvements in financial and technological efficiency in one
category of bank increases the level of activity and the profits of both categories of
banks. In general, it also increases the market share of the bank(s) experiencing
efficiency improvement.
Proof : see Appendix A.
Due to the uncovered nature of the normal loan market, an improvement in effi-
ciency in one category of banks generates absolute positive effects on all banks.
In relative terms, the effects of bank(s) with improved efficiency is to increase its
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(resp. increase their) market share(s) unless the new activity generated by its
efficiency improvement is oriented exclusively toward other banks.1
The benchmark model and its equilibrium properties are now be used to ana-
lyze three modes of foreign bank entry. We then introduce a Foreign Bank (FB)
wanting to penetrate the market through three alternative modes. The first is
the creation a new subsidiary. The second consists of buying a minority share
in the SOB capital. The third consists of minority shares in the capital of the
JSBs. Domestic rules are supposed to prevent the FB from acquiring majority
shareholdings: which is why the FB cannot acquire or control even a small local
bank.
3.3.2 Foreign bank entry through creation of a new sub-
sidiary
If the FB creates a subsidiary, its technology contrasts with the technology of the
local banks. Three main differences have been observed:
- the FB has a greater management efficiency than the domestic banks,
- the FB has few local deposits and more generally, its level of activity is less
dependent on the state of affairs; this low sensitivity to local conditions is however
compensated by its greater access to the international money market,
- the FB has low levels of soft information, which reduces its ability to identify
good loans and to screen normal loans.
The cream skimming effect applies to the FB: high category borrowers prefer to
be served by foreign banks than by the domestic banks. However, due to its lack
of “soft information” the FB only recognizes as good projects a proportion k of
these loans. The remainder is funded by the domestic bank as in the benchmark
1for instance, if those who receive credits from Bank 1 which efficiency has increased make
deposits near Bank 2 followed by new loans distributed by Bank 2 to agents who make deposits
to Bank 2 or 3. . . In this case, despite the direct effect of the improvement of bank 1 efficiency
has only a positive effect on Bank 1, all successive indirect effects increase the profits of other
banks, and can finally result in a decrease of the share of market of Bank 1.
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case. The profit of the FB is then determined by the amount of normal loans xb1
maximizing (3.4):
pib1(xb1) = α¯b [fbxb1 + k(ys +myj)]− 1
tb
[xb1 + k(ys +myj)]
2 (3.4)
where:
- k (0 ≤ k < 1) represents the cream skimming effect. If there is no cream skim-
ming effect, k = 0; and if there is a sizeable cream skimming effect, the value of k
will be very close to 1.
- fb, with (0 ≤ fb < fj < 1) with fb < fj, represents the size/financial efficiency
components of the receipts of the FB respectively for normal loans and for high
quality loans,
- tb with tj ≤ tb, represents the technological efficiency component of the costs of
the FB,
- α¯b with (0 < α¯s < α¯b), is a positive constant capturing the conditions faced by
the foreign bank on the international money market.
In this case, the levels of normal loans xs1 and xj1 funded respectively by the SOB
and the JSBs are determined as the values maximizing equations (3.5) to (3.7):
pis(xs1) = (αsA
e + α¯s) [fsxs1 + (1− k)ys]− 1
ts
[xs1 + (1− k)ys]2 (3.5)
pij(xj1) = (αjA
e + α¯j) [fjxj1 + (1− k)yj]− 1
tj
[xj1 + (1− k)yj]2 (3.6)
If we suppose that the financial flows generated by the new entrant only diffuse in
the domestic country, the effective value A1 of A
e is now given by (3.7):
A1 = (xs1 + ys) +m(xj1 + yj) + xb1 (3.7)
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The equilibrium in this new economy is a vector (xs1∗ , xj1∗ , xb1∗ , A
∗
1), solving equa-
tions (3.4) to (3.7). We can then prove lemma (3.3):
Lemma 3.3. When b′ < 2, there exists one single stable stationary equilibrium
for the “subsidiary model”, such that A1 =
b+fbtbα¯b
2−b′ , xb1 =
1
2
fbtbα¯b − k(ys + myj),
xs1 =
1
2
fsts(
b+fb1tbα¯b
2−b′ αs+α¯s)−(1−k)ys and xj1 = 12fjtj( b+fb1tbα¯b2−b′ αj+α¯j)−(1−k)yj.
Proof : see Appendix B.
The activity generated by the subsidiary of the foreign bank then tends to modify
the level of activity of the domestic banks and the equilibrium of the bank in-
dustry. The conditions of existence and stability of this equilibrium however are
determined only by the interactions between domestic banks. This result is a con-
sequence of the independence of the foreign bank’s returns on domestic conditions.
The foreign bank diffuses (good and bad) indirect effects on the other banks but
not, directly or indirectly, on its own activity.
From lemma (3.3), we then deduce proposition (3.4)
Proposition 3.4. Under the conditions of lemma 3.3, the entry of a foreign bank
by creating a local subsidiary has the following effects:
(i) when the multiplier effect dominates the cream skimming effect, the profits of
the domestic banks improve,
(ii) when the cream skimming effect dominates the multiplier effect, the profits of
the domestic banks decrease.
Proof : see Appendix B.
From this result, we can deduce that, when long term effects are neglected, this
mode of entry is not always a pure advantage for domestic banks. In particular,
if the cream skimming effect is important and the multiplier effect is average, for-
eign bank entry could both increase the level of activity and cause the situation of
local banks to deteriorate. This case is obviously relevant when the normal loans
market is close to being covered.
Chapter 3. Foreign Investment In Emerging Countries: a theoretical model 59
3.3.3 Foreign bank entry through M&A activity with the
SOB
We next examine the second strategy for the foreign bank entry which is to buy a
minority share in the SOB capital. We suppose that this share gives to the entrant
a fraction λ (0 < λ < 1) of the capital and of the profits of the new joint-venture.
Other changes are associated with this M&A on the demand and supply side of
the loans market:
- there is a moderate cream skimming effect: a fraction of the high quality loans
previously directed to the JSBs now prefers the new joint-venture integrating the
foreign bank,
- the soft information gained from the SOB allows the joint-venture to identify
those high quality loans,
- the management efficiency of the joint venture improves the level before the
M&A: it now consists of the technological efficiency of the SOB in the benchmark
model and the technological efficiency of the FB in the case of subsidiary creation.
In this case, the levels of normal loans xsb and xj2 funded respectively by the
joint venture SOB/FB and the JSBs are then determined as the value maximizing
equations (3.8) to (3.9):
pisb(xsb) = (αsA
e + α¯s) [fsxsb + ys + k
′myj]− 1
tsb
(xsb + ys + k
′myj)2 (3.8)
pij2(xj2) = (αjA
e + α¯j) [fjxj2 + (1− k′)yj]− 1
tj
(xj2 + (1− k′)yj)2 (3.9)
where:
- k′ (0 < k′ < 1) represents the proportion of high quality loans leaving the JSBs
to join the joint venture SOB/FB,
- tsb presents the technological efficiency component of the costs of the joint ven-
ture SOB/FB, with ts < tsb < tb.
The effective value A2 of A
e is now given by (3.10):
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A2 = (xsb + ys) +m(xj2 + yj) (3.10)
The profits of the shareholders in the new joint venture are determined by the
profits of domestic shareholders pis2 = (1 − λ)pisb(xsb) and the profits of foreign
shareholders pib2 = λpisb(xsb). If we write b” = fstsbαs+mfjtjαj, we can formulate
the following lemma:
Lemma 3.5. When b” < 2, there exists one single stationary equilibrium for the
M&A SOB model, such that A2 =
fstsbα¯s+mfjtj α¯j
2−b” , xsb =
1
2
fstsb [
fstsbα¯s+mfjtj α¯j
2−b” αs +
α¯s]−(ys+k′myj) and xj2 = 12fjtj[fstsbα¯s+mfjtj α¯j2−b” αj+α¯j]−(1−k′)yj. This equilibrium
is globally stable if b” < 2.
Proof : see Appendix C.
In relation to Lemma 3, note that this kind of entry increases the level of stationary
equilibrium of the banking industry (still measured in terms of total distributed
loans) but also renders its global stability slightly more restrictive.
From lemma 3.5, we can deduce proposition 3.6:
Proposition 3.6. Under the conditions of lemma 3.5,
(i) the M&A is advantageous for the SOB’s domestic share-holders if the cream
skimming effect and the improvements to technological efficiency from the joint
venture are sufficient to compensate retention of a part of the profits by the foreign
shareholders in the FB,
(ii) the M&A is advantageous for both categories of banks (is “Pareto-optimal”)
when there are large improvements in management efficiency for the new joint
venture and smaller cream skimming effects.
Proof : see Appendix C.
In this case, the SOB improves management efficiency. This improvement gener-
ates indirect positive effects for both categories of banks. The reputation effect
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generated by the entry of foreign shareholders in the capital of the SOB also in-
volves a cream-skimming effect from JSBs to the SOB. Simultaneously, the entry
of new foreign shareholders in the capital of the SOB decreases the profit share of
the initial domestic shareholders.
When there is a large improvement in SOB management efficiency and smaller
cream skimming effect, the indirect effect generated by the M&A is able to com-
pensate the cream-skimming effect by the profits to the JSBs: this explains the
second part of the Proposition.
3.3.4 Foreign banks entry through acquisition of JSBs shares
In this case, the FB chooses to acquires shares in the JSBs. These shares rep-
resent a minority shareholding and the FB has to invest in all JSBs to have the
same amount of investment as if it took a share in the SOB. We suppose that
these shares give a fraction λ′ (0 < λ′  1) of the capital and of the profits
of the new joint-ventures between the JSBs and the entrant. Other changes are
associated with this M&A from the demand and supply side of the market of loans:
- there is a moderate cream skimming effect: a fraction of the high quality loans
previously directed to the SOB now prefers the new joint-ventures integrating the
foreign bank 2,
- soft information acquired from the JSBs allows the joint-venture without effort,
to recognize the high quality loans,
- the management efficiency of the joint venture improves from its level before
the M&A: it is now mid-way between the technological efficiency of the JSBs in
the benchmark model and the technological efficiency of the FB in the case of
subsidiary creation.
The levels of normal loans xs3 and xjb funded respectively by the SOB and each JS-
B/FB joint-venture are then determined as the value maximizing equations (3.11)
2One can presume that this effect is however larger than in the case of M&A activity between
the FB and the SOB, since the new joint-ventures tend to mate “good reputation” partners and
to keep away the poorly reputed SOB.
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to (3.12):
pis3(xs3) = (αsA
e + α¯s) [fsxs3 + (1− k′′)ys]− 1
ts
[xs3 + (1− k′′)ys]2 (3.11)
pijb(xjb) = (αjA
e + α¯j) [fjxjb + yj + k
′′ys/m]− 1
tjb
[xjb + yj + k
′′ys/m]2 (3.12)
where:
- k′′ (0 < k′′ < 1) represents the proportion of high quality loans leaving the SOB
in favor of a joint venture JSBs/FB,
- tjb, (tj < tjb < tb), figures the management efficiency component of the costs of
a joint venture JSBs/FB.
The effective value A3 of A
e is now given by (3.13):
A3 = (xs3 + ys) +m(xjb + yj) (3.13)
The profits of the shareholders of the new joint venture are determined as the
profits of domestic shareholders pij3 = (1 − λ′)pijb(xjb) and the profits of foreign
shareholders pib3 = λ
′pijb(xjb) − C where c(m, ys + myj) is the transaction costs
generated by the number of different joint-ventures the foreign bank has to coordi-
nate and make compatible, given that JSBs are only in competition on the covered
segment of the high level loans. The more highly dispersed the FB investment,
the higher will be these transaction costs. Another component of these costs is
the number of high category loans. The higher their number, the higher will be
the transaction costs since the competition - the reason to coordinate JSBs - is
limited to high category loans. Specification (3.14) captures the nature of these
costs which disappear when there is only one JSB and no high level loans:
C = c(m− 1)(ys +myj) (3.14)
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Note b′′′ = fstsαs −mfjtjbαj. We can then prove the following lemma:
Lemma 3.7. When fstsαs + mfjtjbαj < 2, there is one single stationary equilib-
rium for the benchmark model, such that A3 =
fstsα¯s+mfjtjbα¯j
2−b′′′ . Then, the amounts
of standard loans are respectively xs3 =
1
2
fsts[
fstsα¯s+mfjtjbα¯j
2−b′′′ αs+α¯s]−(1−k′′)ys and
xjb =
1
2
fjtjb[
fstsα¯s+mfjtjbα¯j
2−b′′′ αj + α¯j]− (yj + k′′ys/m). This stationary equilibrium is
globally stable when b′′′ < 2.
Proof : see Appendix D.
Note that the cost C has no role in the number of equilibrium loans but only in
the profits of the foreign shareholders in the JV, since this cost does not include
standard loans which are the only loans that vary according the organization of the
banking industry. Note also that the equilibrium number of loans again increases
compared to the number corresponding to the benchmark case. As in the previous
case, the value of b′′′ also increases, which makes the stability of the equilibrium
conditions slightly more restrictive
From lemma 3.7, we then deduce proposition 3.8:
Proposition 3.8. Under the conditions of lemma 3.7,
(i) the M&A is advantageous for the JSBs domestic shareholders when the cream
skimming effect and/or the improvements in technological efficiency of the joint
ventures are sufficient to compensate for the FB’sretention of a part of the profits,
(ii) the M&A is advantageous for the FB when the number of the JSBs is not too
large,
(iii) the M&A is advantageous for the two categories of banks when there are
large improvements in technological efficiency in the new joint venture and smaller
cream skimming effects.
This result differs from Proposition 3, in two ways. Qualitatively, the cream-
skimming effect k′′ is probably larger than k′: this difference generates a bigger
change in the competition conditions from the benchmark case to this one than
from the benchmark case to the case of an entry by M&A activity between the FB
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and the SOB. Transaction costs create another barrier to the development of such
entry. It would be unreasonable to suppose that the FB can find a good solution to
distributing its investment across too large a number of domestic banks, without
any possibility of controlling their management.
3.4 Should economic and financial authorities reg-
ulate foreign banks entry?
As pointed out in the section 3.3, the entry of foreign banks has different global and
redistributive effects on the economy and the banking industry. When the normal
loans market is not covered, all improvements to management and/or financial ef-
ficiency have positive effects on the whole economy and the banking industry. The
redistributive effects are more questionable. When the foreign bank creates a new
subsidiary, it is necessary to investigate whether the cream-skimming effect is com-
pensated by the indirect stimulating effect associated with the activity generated
by the new subsidiary. In the cases of entry of the foreign bank through M&A, the
trade-off is more difficult to analyze. Propositions 3.6 and 3.8 show that this kind
of entry generates two negative components. The first is that increasing the share
of foreign banks in the capital of domestic banks decreases the profits of domestic
shareholders and as a consequence, the motivation of the domestic partners in the
banking industry. The second is a more classic argument: the cream-skimming
effect from one category of banks to the other one generates redistributive effects
among domestic banks and their relative shareholders. These two effects can com-
pensate or not for the good direct and indirect effects generated by the M&A: they
improve the management efficiency of the new joint-venture and they provide new
and safer credits for the economy, which has indirect positive effects.
Emerging countries such as China and India, have defined specific rules to control
the entry of foreign banks. For instance, they have introduced floor limits for
initial foreign investment and ceiling limits on maximum foreign share in domestic
bank in M&As or new subsidiaries. This section evaluates the efficiency of these
limitations. We begin with the case of entry by creating a new subsidiary, and
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then examine the cases of M&A with SOB or JSBs. We introduce some simplifi-
cations in the parameters of the model, none of them changes fundamentally our
conclusions but simplifies how to achieve them.
We introduce the following simplifying assumptions:
• the two types of domestic banks initially have the same total number of high
category loans ys = myj
• the foreign bank induces the same cream skimming effect, whatever the style
of entry it chooses, i.e., k = k′ = k′′
• α¯s = mα¯j and αs = mαj, i.e. the relative size of each bank and the relative
indirect effect of an increase in the distribution of credit on the return of
each bank are proportional.
• the indirect effect of increased distribution of credit on the returns of each
bank which grows at an increased rate is linearized. We then use the
approximation A1αj ' A∗αj + αbd1 with d1 > 0 and linearize the indi-
rect effect of the entry of foreign bank in λ when there the foreign bank
conducts a M&A activity with domestic banks, using the approximations
α¯j + A2αj ' α¯j + A∗αj + λd2 = Q + λd2 and α¯j + A3αj ' Q + λ′d3 with
d2 > d3 > 0 and Q = α¯j + A
∗αj. 3
These four working assumptions simplify how we write the profits in each situa-
tion. They reduce the difference between the subset of the SOBs and the subset of
the JSBs to three important features: the advantage of SOBs related to “financial
efficiency” (soft information), the advantage of JSBs related to technological effi-
ciency, and the relative number / size of each type of bank. However, we suppose
3These simplification apparently underestimates this indirect effect when the increase of the
distribution of credit is large. However, as with large changes in the volume of credit, the
market could come close to the level where all the demand of credit is served, the quality of all
new distribution of credit decreases and our initial evaluation of the indirect effect becomes too
generous. For this reason, we think that this linear form is almost reasonable, and even still
overestimate the indirect effect when λ comes close to 1. d2 is chosen larger than d3 because,
since the financial efficiency of SOB is bigger that the financial efficiency of JOBs (fs ≥ fj), and
given that foreign bank considers the same level of foreign investment λ = λ′, when the foreign
bank conducts a M&A activity with the SOB and with the JSBs, the numerator of A2 increases
more than the numerator of A3 and the denominator of A2 decreases more than the denominator
of A3.
Chapter 3. Foreign Investment In Emerging Countries: a theoretical model 66
that the two categories of banks exert cross symmetric effects. In order to adapt
the model to the comparative statics analysis we make, we now introduce vari-
ability in the efficiency improvement in domestic banks resulting from a merger
between the domestic and foreign banks. This refinement allows us to extend the
analysis of M&A, to different levels of participation of foreign banks in the capital
of domestic banks. We then suppose that in case of a M&A, there is an increasing
relation between the size of the foreign bank minority share and the improvements
in the efficiency of the new joint-venture: the larger the minority foreign share the
greater the efficiency improvements after M&A activity.
The detailed calculus derivation for equations of domestic banks’ profits before
and after entering into emerging banking market with the simplification, please
see Appendix G.
3.4.1 How to regulate the creation of new subsidiaries by
foreign banks?
Under the previous assumptions, we can to compare the domestic banks’ total
profit in the benchmark case, and after the creation of a subsidiary by the new
foreign entrant. Proposition 3.9 formulates the result of this comparison:
Proposition 3.9. Whatever the values of the parameters, when a foreign bank
realizes an entry through the creation of a new subsidiary, there exists a minimal
level of involvement in the international markets of this bank below which entry
decreases the profits of the domestic banks and above which entry increases the
profit of the domestic banks.
Proof : see Appendix E.
If a foreign bank creates a subsidiary, the bank must have adequate possibilities
to access resources and support in the international financial market. This result
can be explained quite easily. All foreign entries generate a cream-skimming effect
which immediately decreases the domestic banks’ profits. From a given level of
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activity of the subsidiary, since the credit market is not covered, the indirect
positive effect generated by the distribution of new credits increases the level of
activity and the profits of the domestic banks. Obviously, this result applies to
emerging countries, with a banking industry that is not fully efficient and with a
not fully credit market since the terms of the trade-off have their origins in these
two characteristics of emerging banking industries.
3.4.2 The case of M&A activity with a SOB
We apply our “welfare” criterion, using r to denote the actualization rate necessary
to calculate the present value of future profits. Given our simplifying assumptions,
and if we consider that the horizon of a bank’s life goes to banks to infinity, the
criterion can be expressed as shown below for a M&A with the SOB:
ΠSOB = (1− δ){(1− λ)m2(Q+ λd2)
[(1− fs)(1 + k)yj + f2s (ts+λn)4 (Q+ λd2)]
+m(Q+ λd2)[(1− fj)(1− k)yj + f
2
j tj
4
(Q+ λd2)]}
+δ{m2(Q+ λd2)[(1− fs)(1 + k)yj + f2s (ts+λn)4 (Q+ λd2)]
+m(Q+ λd2)[(1− fj)(1− k)yj + f
2
j tj
4
(Q+ λd2)]}/r
(3.15)
The first term, weighted with (1 − δ) corresponds to the profits of the domestic
shareholders in the two categories of banks after the M&A activity and the second
term, beginning with δ is the present value of the future profits of those two same
banks.
Expression 3.15 is a degree 4 equation in λ which has the following simplified form:
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ΠSOB = (1− δ)[(1− λ)pisb(λ3) + pij2(λ2)] + δ[pisb(λ3) + pij2(λ2)]/r
The expression is defined for values of λ comprised between 0 and 1. The dom-
inant term (1 − δ)(1 − λ)pisb(λ3) ultimately moves negatively when λ goes to 1.
The other terms move positively when λ goes from 0 to 1, which makes ambiguous
the resulting variation of the (3.15) in the range of variation of λ. It is then more
difficult for the domestic authorities to determine a value of λ maximizing the
index (3.15) 4. When the authority chooses small values for δ, i.e., considers that
the bank profit is the dominant criterion, it has no reason to restrict the amount
of shares acquired by the foreign bank. In contrast, when the level of the domestic
shareholders profits that matters, then there is no reason to restrict these shares.
It is only by mitigating the two terms, i.e. with intermediate values of δ, that we
obtain an interior solution in λ. Numerical simulations involving different ranges
of the variation of δ (see Appendix 6 ) illustrate this result. We then can formulate
the following proposition:
Proposition 3.10. When the objective of the economic and financial regulation
authority is to maximize the wealth of the initial domestic banks shareholders, it
has no interest in limiting the share of capital of foreign banks in a M&A with the
SOB. However, such a limitation would be justified if the authority considers that
the wealth of the future domestic shareholders also matters.
Proof : see Appendix F.
3.4.3 The case of M&A activity with a JOB
This case is quite similar to the case of a M&A with the SOB. We use the same
parameter δ to weight the two component of the welfare index which continue to
integrate (1− δ)% of the domestic shareholders profit after M&A activity and δ%
of the present value of future profits of the two categories of banks. Thus total
4Our simplifications, in particular in concerning the link between the management efficiency
improvement and the form of the indirect effect have no influence on this ambiguous result which
is due to well identified reasons.
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welfare of domestic banking industry for a M&A with the JSBs is as below:
ΠJSB = (1− δ){m2(Q+ λ′d3)[(1− fs)(1− k)yj + f2s ts4 (Q+ λ′d3)]
+(1− λ′)m(Q+ λ′d3)[(1− fj)(1 + k)yj + f
2
j (tj+λ
′n)
4
(Q+ λ′d3)}
+δ{m2(Q+ λ′d3)[(1− fs)(1− k)yj + f2s ts4 (Q+ λ′d3)]
+m(Q+ λ′d3)× [(1− fj)(1 + k)yj + f
2
j (tj+λ
′n)
4
}/r
(3.16)
which also provides a degree 4 equation in λ′ with a similar form to the previous
one:
ΠJSB = (1− δ)[pis3(λ′2) + (1− λ′)pijb(λ′3)] + δ[pis3(λ′2) + pijb(λ′3)]/r
In this case, we have the same causes, same effects, the same numerical simula-
tions and the same observations were made in this case. We can then formulate
(without any redundant proof) formulate the proposition 3.11
Proposition 3.11. When the objective of the economic and financial regulation
authority is to maximize the wealth of the initial domestic banks shareholders, it
has no interest in limiting the share of the foreign bank’s in a M&A with JSBs.
However, this limitation would be justified if the authority considers that the wealth
of the future domestic shareholders also matters.
3.5 Further researches and conclusion of Chap-
ter 3
This chapter has contributed to analyze of the complex effect of foreign bank en-
try on domestic banking industry. I studied three entry modes: (1) creation of
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a new subsidiary, (2) the M&A with a State Owned Bank (large bank), and (3)
M&A activity with Joint Stock Banks (small banks). When the standard quality
loans market is not fully covered by the domestic banks, we find that the en-
try of foreign banks can improve the “state of affairs”, thereby compensating the
cream-skimming effect on the domestic banks, and ultimately increasing the level
of activity and/or profits for a part of the domestic banking industry. The model
considered the conditions under which domestic bank shareholders increase their
profits after an entry mode corresponding to cases (2) and (3).
According to our theoretical model, in order for the domestic bank profits are
maintained in the foreign new subsidiary case, the domestic authority should set
up minimum initial foreign capital investment restrictions for foreign banks as α¯b.
For the cases of M&A with SOB and M&A with JSBs, the domestic authority
must set up the best level of foreign ownership λ∗ and λ∗∗ respectively in order to
maintain the profitability of domestic banking industry.
Our results are interesting for both parties and for different modes of entry. They
show that not all modes of entry are positive if we consider the domestic banking
industry as a whole. Future analyses will focus on the endogenous strategy of the
foreign entrant.
Chapter 4
Foreign Bank Entry on Domestic
Banking Industry in Emerging
Countries: an empirical model
analysis
4.1 Introduction to Chapter 4
In recent years, many emerging countries have promoted financial industry re-
forms. These reforms range from encouraging the emergence of new private banks,
to open the access of foreign banks to M&A activity involving domestic banks.
However, opening to competition of the financial industry is a complex issue as it
is closely related to structural reforms in domestic financial sector with planned
and actual implications on macro-economic stability.
As a joint consequence of development and liberalization, international trade and
financial services has become more and more important. Many banking insti-
tutions also become international in order to facilitate international capital flow
and international financial service. Foreign banks have increased their presence in
emerging countries by opening representative office or new branches, sub-branches,
by acquiring minority ownership stakes of domestic banks, or by setting up new lo-
cal incorporations. With entering of foreign banks, the emerging banking markets
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have been subjected to structural changes and domestic banks need to improve
their ability to face with more competition. So, it is crucial to assess these kinds
of modifications.
This chapter examines the foreign entry effect on 6 Asian emerging countries by
using a empirical model. We aim to provide systematic analyses of how foreign
bank entry has affected Asian banking industry. To do this, we use bank-level
accounting data of China, India, Indonesia, Korea, Philippines and Thailand for
the 1998 - 2011 period. We find that M&A activities have positive effect on prof-
itability of domestic banks. Another interesting finding of this article is that the
level of foreign investment in domestic banks is more important than whether for-
eign bank conduct M&A activities with domestic banks. Moreover, foreign banks
have stronger influence for countries with foreign entry restrictions than countries
without foreign entry restrictions. Foreign bank entry has both direct effect on
current year and one-year lag effect for domestic banking industry. However, for-
eign direct effects are stronger than foreign one-year lag effect.
Section 4.2 reviews the literature on M&A activities in the banking industry,
banks’ efficiency change after M&A activities and financial revolution of 6 Asian
countries. Section 4.3 presents a data set of 86 banks from 6 Asian countries,
empirical analyses and results. Section 4.4 displays comments and conclusion.
4.2 Literature Review
4.2.1 Asian banking industries
Asian countries have conducted crucial regulatory changes in their banking indus-
tries since the Asian financial crisis. Although there are big differences between
these reforms in each county, all Asian countries moved obstacles for facilitating
foreign banks entries. The reform of foreign entry limitation is one of the central
elements of the Asian restructuring plans. Based on the analysis of Sasidaran and
Ramkishen (2010), we could separate Asian countries into 2 groups according to
their rules of governing foreign equity limits in the domestic banking sector: the
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enthusiastic liberalizers (Indonesia, Korea, Thailand and Philipines) and the cau-
tious liberalizers (China and India).
(1) China
According to the development process of the current Chinese banking industry,
there are three stages: the formation and development period (from 1949 to 1978),
the reform and development period (from 1949 to 2008) and the period of ad-
justment and opportunities (from 2009 to now). Since joining the World Trade
Organization (WTO) on January 1, 2002, China has continuously enforced the
so-called open door policy in the Chinese banking industry. All restrictions for
foreign banks were cancelled in 2007.
Not like most of the other Asian economies undertook more aggressive domes-
tic liberalization, the restructure of Chinese financial sector is primarily driven by
obligations since China entry into WTO. Therefore the penetration level of foreign
banks in China remains very small and Chinese government enforces complicated
foreign bank regulatory requirements. Based on the legal requirement of Chinese
banking industry (Regulations for the Administration of Foreign funded banks),
the maximum share a single foreign investor may take in a local bank was 20 per-
cent and the overall maximum multiple foreign shareholding is set at 25 percent.
The Chinese government also set up the minimum asset requirement for foreign
banks: such as foreign bank needs a higher assets requirement for establishing a
foreign branch than a foreign subsidiary or foreign joint venture bank. Foreign
branches not allowed to do retail business in China while foreign subsidiaries are
eligible to do so. In reality foreign banks are encouraged to have local incorpo-
ration in China according to the regulation we mentioned above. Those foreign
banks that do not do so will not be allowed to accept deposits of less than one
million RMB.
(2) India
Since early 1990s, India started its financial liberalization process gradually. In-
dian financial environment was more liberal than in China. Generally speaking
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concerning the banking operation, Indian government treats no discriminatory be-
tween domestic banks and foreign banks. Even in some cases Indian government
supported more favorably to foreign banks than to domestic banks. In the Indian
banking industry, foreign banks can undertake almost all banking activities no
matter retail banking or wholesale banking business. The Indian government also
widened the presence of foreign banks in its banking industry by allowing them to
establish foreign branches or 100 percent wholly owned subsidiary. Moreover, for-
eign equity ownership changed from 49 percent (before the Asian Financial Crisis)
to 74 percent.
(3) Philippine
Since the Asian Financial Crisis Philippines has undergone a substantial restruc-
turing of its banking system. Like the others Asian countries, Philippines gov-
ernment modified its general banking act to facilitate the entry of foreign banks.
Before the crisis, Philippines implemented a tight restriction for foreign banks, for
instance, a higher set of minimum capital requirements, liquidity cover on foreign
currency liabilities, a cap on loans to real estate and regulations on derivatives
trading and etc. After the crisis the Central Bank of the Philippines (BSP) signed
the General Banking Law (2000) to amend the old General Banking Act. The
new General Banking Act meets the challenges of globalization and provides addi-
tional safeguard for its banking industry by improving prudential and regulatory
standards and enhancing the supervisory capabilities.
According to the old Foreign bank Liberalization Act of 1994, Philippines only
allowed foreign bank entry through one of the following entry modes: (1) acquire,
purchase or own up to 60 percent of the stock of an existing domestic bank, (2)
invest in up to 60 percent of the voting stock of a new banking subsidiary incor-
porated in the Philippines, or (3) establish a branch with full banking authority
(has a sunset provision for 5 years and only limited to 10 foreign banks). The new
act encourages the liberalization of foreign banks by enlarging the time limit of
the third entry mode to 7 years. However, the act points out that the share of
foreign majority-owned banks shall not exceed 30 percent of the total resources or
asset of the banking system.
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(4) Indonesia
Being strongly hit by the Asian financial crisis, Indonesia conducted its financial
sector revolution as an enthusiastic liberalizer. It was very active in taking a
comprehensive financial restructure. In 1998 the Indonesian Bank Restructuring
Agency (IBRA) was set up by Indonesian government in order to solve the prob-
lems in the domestic banking sector. The aim of the IBRA is to address the issue
of non-performing loans in domestic banking industry and bad effect of the Asian
financial crisis. Moreover, the Indonesian government also made some important
regulatory changes in its financial sector. One of the most significant changes is
that Indonesian government removed some restrictions on foreign participation in
its domestic banking industry. Under the New Banking Law which is issued in
the November of 1998, foreign banks could take over Indonesian banks and invest
in unlisted and listed banks, foreign non-bank institutions is allowed to purchase
Indonesian banks. The New Banking Law also removed the restrictions on the
expansion of branches of foreign joint venture banks.
(5) Korea
During the post-crisis restructuring process, Korea government removed all the
regulatory obstacles to encourage the entry of foreign banks. The shock of Asian
financial crisis made the Korea government realize that it is important to maintain
the level of foreign participation in order to assist the recapitalization and enhance
domestic banks’ efficiency. So, Korea government encouraged foreign investment
by shifting financial obstacles.
Before the crisis, the limit of foreign equity ownership was 49 percent. After the
crisis, Financial Supervisory Commission of Korea removed this restriction and al-
lowed foreign bank ownership up to 100%. Once foreign ownership stakes exceed
to 10, 25 and 33 percent up to 100 percent, foreign bank needs to be approved by
Financial Supervisory Commission of Korea.
(6) Thailand
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Similar with the other aggressive liberalizer, Thailand conducted financial regula-
tory reform after the Asian financial crisis by allowing 100 percent foreign own-
ership of the domestic financial institutions for a 10 year period, after which the
foreign banks will be allowed to buy additional shares only if their shares below
49 percent of total equity. In 2004 the Financial Sector Master Plan allows foreign
banks to apply for two types of licenses: (1) a foreign bank as a subsidiary enjoys
the same scope of business as a commercial bank, and could open 1 branch within
Bangkok and 3 branches elsewhere in Thailand; (2) foreign bank could apply for
a full foreign branch and enjoys the same scope of business as a commercial bank,
however is not allowed to open any branches.
4.2.2 The impact of foreign bank on domestic banking in-
dustry
Generally speaking, foreign bank entry can affect competition level of domestic
banking industry, influence the efficiency of domestic banks, and have an impact
on the stability of domestic banking system. Foreign bank entry has both positive
effect and negative effect for domestic banking industry. When foreign banks in-
crease their presence in domestic market, they push pressure on domestic banks to
conduct certain revolutions, for example: reducing costs, providing more various
products and service, becoming more efficient, using more advanced techniques,
learning modern practices from foreign banks and etc. Foreign bank entry has
competition effect which means that more competition leads to lower income and
profits, and higher efficiency. However, the entry of foreign bank also has “cream
skimming” effect for domestic banks, for instance having experience in interna-
tional transaction, attracting clients of domestic banks, providing better products
and services, having better access to international financial market and etc. There-
fore domestic banks could have lower income and profits.
4.2.2.1 Against of foreign entry
Goldberg, Gerard Dages and Kinney (2000) also mention that there are 3 primary
arguments against opening domestic financial system to foreign ownership: (1)
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increase in foreign-owned financial institutions will decrease the stability of do-
mestic financial industry; (2) foreign institutions have “cream skimming” effect by
attracting high level clients from domestic banks; (3) complex financial institutions
in domestic financial industry will increase the multiple challenges to supervision.
Claessens, Demirfu¨c¸-Kunt and Huizinga (2001) analyze extent and effect of for-
eign bank presence in domestic market by using 7900 banks from 80 countries for
the 1988-1995 period. They observe foreign banks have higher profit than domes-
tic banks in developing countries and point out that foreign entry for developing
countries is associated with a reduction in profitability and margin for domestic
banks.
Uiboupin (2004) estimates foreign bank entry on bank performance in the Central
and Eastern European countries and point out that foreign entry increases compe-
tition in the host country and has negative effect on domestic banks’ profitability,
revenues and non-interest income. Hellmann, Murdock and Stiglitz (2000) present
that if foreign bank entry harms the franchise value of domestic banks, they will
facilitate prudent investment (take on greater risks).
4.2.2.2 Favor of foreign entry
Goldberg, Gerard Dages and Kinney (2000) mention that there are 3 primary ar-
guments in favor of opening domestic financial sectors to foreign ownership: (1)
foreign entry diversifies the capital, increases the amount of funding, supports the
supply of domestic credit and increases the stability of available lending; (2) it can
also improve the quality, pricing and availability of financial products and services;
(3) it can finally improve financial system infrastructure which includes accounting
and transparency, financial regulation and increased presence of supporting agents
such as auditors and rating agencies.
Clarke, Cull, D’Amato and Molinari (1999) conduct analysis for Argentine in
mid-1990s and find that foreign bank entry is associated with heightened compe-
tition in the domestic banking industry and increased domestic banks’ efficiency.
Demirguc-Kunt, Levine and Min (1998) analyze for a large sample of countries
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over the period 1988-1995, and find that foreign bank participation lowers the in-
cidence of local banking crisis and accelerates overall economic growth by boosting
domestic banking efficiency.
Hermes and Lensink (2001) redo the same analysis of Claessens, Demirfu¨c¸-Kunt
and Huizinga (2001) for less developed countries (LDCs). They find foreign entry
leads to an increasement in domestic banks’ income, profits and cost. They also
substantiate an inverted U-shaped relationship between foreign entry and domestic
performance which indicates the cost and profits reduce only when foreign entry
has reached a certain minimum level.
4.3 Data and the empirical model
We use information from the financial statement of domestic commercial banks.
The data come from the Thomson One data base. Banks included roughly ac-
count for 80% of the total asset of banks in each countries. All data in Thomson
One data base derived from well-known Thomson Financial sources, including
SDC Platinum, Edgar filings, I/B/E/S and Worldscope and many more. This is
a comprehensive data base that allows cross-country comparisons. The data are
compiled by Thomson One mostly from the balance sheets, income statements
and applicable notes from banks’ annual reports.
We compile a data set covering 86 banks from 6 countries (China, India, Indonesia,
Korea, Philippines and Thailand) for the 1998 - 2011 period. This data set in-
cludes all important developing Asian countries. Table 5.1 below summarizes the
total number of banks available in Thomson One for each country and restrictions
of foreign equity ownership for each country.
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Table 4.1: Summery of the total number of banks available in “Thomson One”
and restrictions of foreign equity ownership
Country No. banks Pre-crisis Foreign Ownership Post-crisis Foreign Ownership
China 15 Not available 1 bank 20% and more banks 25%
India 23 49% 74%
Philippine 11 60% 60%
Indonesia 20 49% 100%
Korea 7 49% 100%
Thailand 10 25% 100%
4.3.1 Empirical model
The empirical model we used is based on the theoretical model of Chapter 41:
Iijt = α0 + α1Fijt + α2Bijt + α3Cjt + εijt (4.1)
Where Iijt is the dependent variable (bank’s profitability) for domestic bank i in
county j at time t; Fijt are foreign bank M&A activities with domestic bank i in
county j at time t (i.e., shares of foreign investment in domestic banks and whether
foreign bank conduct M&A activities with domestic bank);Bijt are bank variables
for domestic bank i in county j at time t; Cjt are country variables for county j at
time t. Furthermore, α0 is a constant; α1, α2 and α3 are coefficients; and εijt is
an error term. All regressions include country and time-specific fixed effects.
4.3.1.1 Dependent variable
Dependent variable represents the profitability of domestic banks. From the bank’s
income statement and balance sheet, we get the following accounting indentity:
1. NI/TA (Net income / Total asset):
Net income to total asset ratio is the accounting values of a bank’s net
income over its total asset. This ratio provides a standard for evaluating
1pis(xs) = (αsA
e + α¯s)(fsxs + ys)− 1ts (xs + ys)2
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how efficiently financial management employs the money invested in the
bank’s assets. It measures how efficiently profits are being generated from
the total assets employed.
2. NM/TA (Net interest margin / Total Asset):
Net interest income to total asset ratio is the accounting values of a bank’s
net interest income over its total asset. This ratio measures the difference
between the interest income generated by banks and the amount of interest
paid out to their lenders (deposits), relative to the amount of their total
assets.
3. NII/TA (Non-interest income / Total asset):
Non-interest income to total asset ratio is the accounting values of a bank’s
non-interest income over its total asset. Besides traditional lending activ-
ities, banks also engage in some other non-lending activities, for instance
investment banking, securities activities (for example, securities underwrit-
ing, brokering, dealing and etc), insurance activities (for example, insurance
writing and selling), and real estate activities. This ratio captures banks’
profitability in non-lending activities.
4. NIE/TA (Non-interest expense/ Total asset):
Non-interest expense to total asset ratio is the accounting values of a bank’s
non-interest expense over its total asset. Non-interest expense presents the
normal operating expense associated with the daily operation of a bank.
Generally speaking, non-interest expense includes salaries and benefits, ex-
pense of premises and fixed assets, and other non-interest expense.
5. LLP/TA (Loan loss provision / Total asset):
Loan loss provision represents a non-cash expense for banks to account for
future losses on loan defaults. It measures the actual provisioning for bad
debts over total assets. The differences of this ratio may reflect the difference
in banks’ customer mix; for instance banks focus on large corporations or
concentrate on consumer loans. Moreover, it also shows the banks’ ability
to screen bad credit risk and banks’ willingness to provision for bad risks.
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4.3.1.2 Independent variables
• Foreign bank variables: The first independent variable is the foreign bank
variable. It presents foreign banks’ presence in domestic banking industry.
We define this variable as following:
1. F1:
Shares of foreign investment in domestic banks: This article only con-
siders foreign banks use M&A activities to entry into domestic market.
This variable represents the percentage of foreign bank asset in domes-
tic banks’ asset. This variable captures actual foreign banks’ presence
and foreign influence of domestic banks.
2. F2:
This variable shows whether foreign bank conduct M&A activities with
domestic bank: This variable is a dummy variable, if foreign bank con-
ducts M&A activities with domestic bank, the value of this dummy
variable is 1; if not, the value of this dummy variable is 0.
• Domestic bank variables: Domestic bank variables represent the financial
structure of domestic banks. From the bank’s balance sheet, we get the
following accounting indentity:
1. L/D (Loan / Deposit):
Loan to deposit ratio is the accounting values of a bank’s total loans
over its total deposits. It is a commonly used statistic for assessing a
bank’s liquidity.
2. E/TA (Equity / Total Asset):
This variable is the value of equity divided by the value of total asset
for each bank. This ratio indicates the bank’s leverage, the amount of
liabilities used to finance bank.
• Domestic countries variables: Domestic countries variables presents the “macro
environment” components of each countries. We define this variable as fol-
lowing:
1. GDP rate:
It presents the annual GDP growth rate for each country over estimated
periods.
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2. Inflation:
It presents the annual inflation rate for each country over estimated
periods.
4.3.2 Results of empirical model
4.3.2.1 Results for all 6 countries
First of all, we conducted analyses for all 6 countries. All regression models con-
sider both the country fixed effect and time fixed effect. According to Drukker
(2003) and Wooldridge (2002), we also conduct tests for panel-level heteroskedas-
ticity (Likelihood-ratio test) and autocorrelation (Wooldridge test).
The estimation results (see TABLE 5.2), indicate that foreign bank entry (F1 and
F2) is significantly associated with an increasement in domestic bank net margin
(column 3), non-interest income ratio (column 5 and 6), non-interest expense ratio
(column 7 and 8) and loan loss provision ratio (column 9 and 10). We do not see
a significant association of net income ratio with foreign entry.
We interpret these results to mean that foreign bank entry is associate with greater
efficiency in the domestic banking industry. Positive effect of net margin represents
foreign bank entry force domestic banks can improve their efficiency in traditional
lending activities. High non-interest income and high non-interest expense reflect
that foreign bank entry enable domestic banks to enlarge their non-lending activ-
ities. Since foreign bank entry has stronger positive effect for non-interest income
than for non-interest expense; the net non-interest profit is higher according to
foreign bank entry effect. We also find that the foreign share variable (F1) has
stronger effect of these four dependent variables than foreign dummy variable (F2).
Therefore, we interpret that for these six Asian developing countries, the level of
foreign bank penetration is more important than whether foreign bank conducted
M&A activities with domestic banks.
High level of loan loss provision presents foreign bank entry promoted the changes
in the regulatory environment in these six countries. After Asian financial crisis,
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many Asian central banks and supervisory authorities tightened their prudential
supervision in order to ensure their banks could bear further risk. Therefore, along
with foreign bank entry, Asian banks become more conservative and move closer
to international norms.
For example, in 2002 China conducted a broader convergence with international
practice; the loan classification rules for specific reserves were mandated. And
since 2005 Chinese banks have been required to set aside general reserves of at
least 1% of loans outstanding. In 2005 India has raised its benchmark gerneral
provision level for standard loan from 0.25% to0.4%; in 2006 it has increased the
required reserve level for performing personal loans, residential housing loans, cap-
ital market-related and commercial real estate loans from 0.4% to 1%; moreover
in 2007 it further raised provision for personal loans and capital market-related
and commercial real estate loans from 1% to 2%, and increased provisioning re-
quirements for banks’ exposure to systemically important non-deposit-taking non-
banking finance companies from 0.4% to 2%. Philippines adopted new accounting
standards in 2005 which results a higher level of reserve ration than before. In-
donesia adopted a prudential loan classification scheme with five grades in 1998,
and in 2005 it enforced a tighter definition of these grades. Similarly, Korea also
conducted tightened provision norms step by step. For instance, in Korea the
general reserve requirement for corporate loan was raised from 0.5% in 1999 to
0.7% in2005, and then to 0.85% in 2007. Thailand also significantly increased the
minimum loan loss provision in 1998, and in 2006 it further tightened provisioning
standards.
Turning to other control variables, we see that Equity/Total Asset ratio has posi-
tive relationship with net income, net margin, non-interest income and non-interest
expense. For a bank, the non-interest expenses include almost all operating and
overhead expense, for example operation and maintenance of facilities, equipments,
furniture and vehicles, employee benefits, unemployment tax and etc. Based on
our results, if a bank’s Equity/Total Asset ratio increases, it will has slight positive
effect for bank’s non-interest expenses. Loan/Deposit ratio has positive relation
with net margin ratio and non-interest expense ratio. If bank uses more of it de-
posits to make a loan, the net margin increases. And because bank makes more
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loans, the non-interest expense increases.
GDP growth rate is positively related to the net income ratio which interprets that
an increase in economic activity has positive effect of banks’ overall profitability.
Because the economic boom increases people’s demand more serve of bank; and
due to high demand for banks, bank could have a higher level of overall profit. The
inflation presents a significant negative relationship with net income, non-interest
activities and loan loss provision which is coincident with the reality.
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4.3.2.2 Results for countries with foreign entry restrictions
I also conduct analyses for countries with foreign entry restrictions which include
China, India and Philippines (TABLE 5.3).
Table 4.3: Foreign entry restrictions in China, India and Philippines
Country Foreign equity ownership
China 20% for single foreign investor
25% overall investment limit.
India 74% overall investment limit.
Philippines 60% overall investment limit.
The estimation results (See TABLE 5.4), indicate that foreign bank entry (F1 and
F2) is significantly associated with an increasement in non-interest income ratio
(column 6) and loan loss provision ratio (column 9 and 10). We do not see a
significant association of net income, net margin, and non-interest expense with
foreign entry.
We interpret these results indicate that foreign bank entry is associate with higher
level of the domestic banks’ non-interest income. Similar with the results for all
6 countries, we find that the foreign share variable (F1) has stronger effect of
loan loss provision than foreign dummy variable (F2). Foreign dummy variable
(F2) has effect for non-interest income, while foreign share variable (F1) does not
have significant effect for this dependent variable. Therefore, we interpret that for
these three countries with foreign restrictions, the level of foreign bank penetra-
tion is more important for loan loss provision than whether foreign bank conducted
M&A activities with domestic banks; and whether foreign bank conducted M&A
activities with domestic banks has important effect for the non-interest income of
domestic banks.
Turning to others control variables, we see that Equity/Total Asset ratio has a
positive relationship with net income, net margin, non-interest income and non-
interest expense. Based on these results, if a bank’s Equity/Total Asset ratio
increases, it will have slight positive effect for bank’s non-interest income and non-
interest expenses. Since Equity/Total Asset ratio has strong positive effect for
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bank’s non-interest income than non-interest expense, we interpret this ratio has
positive effect for bank’s net non-interest income. Equity/Total Asset ratio has a
negative relationship with loan loss provision. Loan/Deposit ratio has a positive
relationship with net margin, non-interest income, and loan loss provision and it
has negative relationship with net income and non-interest expense. If bank uses
more of it deposits to make a loan, the net margin increases; it is also has positive
effect for non-interest income.
GDP growth rate is positively related to the non-interest income and loan loss
provision which interpret that an increase in economic activity has positive effect
of banks’ non-interest activity and arises bank’s cautious for the possibilities of
bad loans. The result shows that inflation presents a significant negative relation-
ship with non-interest income, non-interest expense and loan loss provision which
is coincident with the reality. However, results also present that inflation has pos-
itive effect of bank’s net margin, which is consistent with the research of Huybens
and Smith (1999), and Demirguc-Kunt, Laeven and Levine R.(2003).
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4.3.2.3 Results for countries without foreign entry restrictions
Then, we conduct analyses for countries without foreign entry restrictions, which
include Indonesia, Korea, and Thailand.
The estimation results (See TABLE 5.5), indicate that foreign bank entry (F1 and
F2) is significantly associated with an increasement in domestic bank net margin
(column 3), non-interest income ratio (column 5 and 6), non-interest expense ratio
(column 7 and 8) and loan loss provision ratio (column 9). There is no significant
association of net income ratio with foreign entry. These results are quite similar
with our analysis for all 6 countries.
We could also see that foreign dummy variable (F2) has less or no effect than
the foreign share variable (F1) on bank’s net margin, non-interest activities and
loan loss provision. Therefore, we interpret that for these three countries without
foreign restrictions, the level of foreign bank penetration is more important than
whether foreign bank conducted M&A activities with domestic banks. Because
for these countries, even before the Asian Financial Crisis, there were some foreign
banks had already entered into their domestic market.
Turning to other control variables, we find that Equity/Total Asset ratio has pos-
itive relationship with net income, non-interest income and non-interest expense.
We also see that Loan/Deposit ratio has positive relation with net income, net
margin, non-interest expense and loan loss provision. GDP growth rate is posi-
tively related to the net income ratio which interprets that an increase in economic
activity has positive effect of banks’ overall profitability. The inflation presents
a significant negative relationship with net income ratio and non-interest expense
which is coincident with the reality.
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4.3.3 Results of empirical model for all 6 countries with
lag effect
4.3.3.1 Results of all 6 countries with one-year lag data
We conducted analyses for all 6 countries with one-year lag effect. This section we
want to test whether foreign entry has continuous influence for domestic banking
industry in the following year. Same as our former analyses, all regression models
consider both the country fixed effect and time fixed effect. According to Drukker
(2003) and Wooldridge (2002), we also conduct tests for panel-level heteroskedas-
ticity (Likelihood-ratio test) and autocorrelation (Wooldridge test).
The estimation results (See TABLE 5.6), indicate that foreign bank entry (F1 and
F2) is significantly associated with an increasement in domestic bank net margin
(column 3), non-interest income ratio (column 5 and 6), non-interest expense ratio
(column 7 and 8) and loan loss provision ratio (column 9 and 10). We do not see
a significant association of net income ratio with foreign entry.
We interpret that these results show foreign bank entry is associate with greater
lag efficiency in the domestic banking industry. Positive effect of net margin repre-
sents foreign bank entry force domestic banks improve their efficiency in traditional
lending activities. High non-interest income and high non-interest expense reflect
that foreign bank entry enable domestic banks to enlarge their non-lending activ-
ities. Since foreign bank entry has stronger positive effect for non-interest income
than for non-interest expense; the net non-interest profit is higher thanks to for-
eign bank entry effect. We could also see that the foreign share variable (F1) has
stronger effect of these four dependent variables than foreign dummy variable (F2).
Therefore, we interpret that for these six Asian developing countries the level of
foreign bank penetration is more important than whether foreign bank conducted
M&A activities with domestic banks. These one-year lag effects are smaller than
direct foreign entry effect.
Turning to other control variables, we find that Equity/Total Asset ratio has pos-
itive relationship with net income, net margin, non-interest income and loan loss
provision. Loan/Deposit ratio has negative effect with net income and positive
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relation with net margin ratio and non-interest expense ratio. If bank uses more
of it deposits to make a loan, the net margin increases. Because bank makes more
loans, the non-interest expense increases.
GDP growth rate is positively related to the non-interest income and loan loss pro-
vision. The inflation presents a significant negative relationship with non-interest
activities and loan loss provision which is coincident with the reality and it has
negative effect with net margin.
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4.3.3.2 Results for 3 countries with foreign entry restrictions with lag
effect
The estimation results (See TABLE 5.7), indicate that foreign bank entry (F1 and
F2) is significantly associated with an increasement in loan loss provision ratio
(column 9 and 10). We do not see a significant association of net income, net
margin, non-interest income and non-interest expense with foreign entry.
We interpret that these results mean foreign bank entry is associate with higher
level of the domestic bank’s non-interest income. Similar with the results for all
6 countries, we could see that the foreign share variable (F1) has stronger effect
of loan loss provision than foreign dummy variable (F2). Foreign dummy variable
(F2) has effect for non-interest income, while foreign share variable (F1) does not
have significant effect for this dependent variable. Therefore, we interpret that for
these 3 countries with foreign restrictions, the level of foreign bank penetration
is more important for loan loss provision than whether foreign bank conducted
M&A activities with domestic banks; and whether foreign bank conducted M&A
activities with domestic banks has important effect for the non-interest income of
domestic banks. Moreover the results of one-year lag data have slightly stronger
effect which means that foreign entry has lag effect for domestic countries with
foreign restriction.
Turning to others control variables, we see that Equity/Total Asset ratio has
positive relationship with net income, net margin, non-interest income and nega-
tive effect for loan loss provision. Loan/Deposit ratio has positive relation to net
margin, and it has negative relationship with net income and non-interest expense.
GDP growth rate is positively related to the non-interest income and loan loss
provision which interpret that an increase in economic activity has positive effect
of banks’ non-interest activity and arises bank’s cautious for the possibilities of
bad loan. The result shows that inflation presents a significant negative relation-
ship with non-interest income, non-interest expense and loan loss provision which
is coincident with the reality. However, the result also present that inflation has
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positive effect of bank’s net margin, which is consistent with the research of Huy-
bens and Smith (1999), and Demirguc-Kunt, Laeven and Levine R.(2003).
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4.3.3.3 Results for 3 countries without foreign entry restrictions with
lag effect
Then we conduct the analyses for countries without foreign entry restrictions,
which include Indonesia, Korea, and Thailand by using one-year lag data.
The estimation results (See TABLE 5.8), indicate that foreign bank entry (F1 and
F2) is significantly associated with an increasement in domestic bank net margin
(column 3), non-interest income ratio (column 5 and 6), non-interest expense ra-
tio (column 7 and 8) and loan loss provision ratio (column 9). We do not see a
significant association of net income ratio with foreign entry. These results are
quite similar with our analysis for all 6 countries.
We could also see that foreign dummy variable (F2) has less or no effect than the
foreign share variable (F1) for bank’s net margin, non-interest activities and loan
loss provision. Therefore, we could interpret that for these Asian developing coun-
tries without foreign restrictions, the level of foreign bank penetration is more
important than whether foreign bank conducted M&A activities with domestic
banks. Because for these countries, even before the Asian financial crisis, there
were some foreign banks had already entered into their domestic market. These
one-year lag effects are slightly smaller than direct foreign entry effect except for
net margin ratio.
Turning to other control variables, we see that Equity/Total Asset ratio has pos-
itive relationship with net income, non-interest income and non-interest expense.
We also see that Loan/Deposit ratio has positive relation with net margin, non-
interest expense and loan loss provision. GDP growth rate is positively related to
the net income ratio which interprets that an increase in economic activity have
positive effect of banks’ overall profitability. The inflation presents a significant
negative relationship with net income ratio which is coincident with the reality.
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4.3.4 Foreign bank entry’s lag effect on domestic countries
Based on our analyses, we find that foreign entry has continuous effect for the
following year. No matter on current year or the following year, foreign entry al-
ways has positive effect for the profitability of domestic banks. TABLE 5.9 shows
the increase or decrease of foreign entry’s lag effect comparing with the effect on
current year. “-” signal means lag effect is less than foreign effect in the current
year; and “+” signal means lag effect is stronger than foreign effect on current
year. Except 4 “+” signals, 12 “-” signals prove that the general lag effect of
foreign entry decreases in the following year.
Based on Table 5.3, there are 3 effects increase for non-interest expense ratio.
Because non-interest activities include salaries and benefits, expense of premises
and fixed assets, buildings and other non-interest expense, improvement on these
activities need longer time after M&A activities. Therefore, the effect of foreign
entry increased in the following year. There is another “+” signal of net-margin
ratio for 3 countries without foreign restrictions. Since foreign banks had already
entered into these 3 countries, foreign entry had less effect on current year.
All “-” signals prove that even though foreign entry has less influence for domestic
banks in the following year, it still has positive influence for the whole domestic
banking industry, which coincide with reality.
Table 4.9: The change of foreign entry effect on domestic countries
NI/TA NM/TA NII/TA NIE/TA LLP/TA
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10)
All 6 countires
F1 - - + -
F2 - - -
countries with restrictions
F1 +
F2 - -
countries without restrictions
F1 + - + -
F2 - -
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4.4 Conclusion and Further researches for Chap-
ter 4
This paper serves to demonstrate the impact of foreign banks entry on bank per-
formance in six Asian developing countries. Our results indicate that foreign bank
entry is associated with an increase in domestic banks’ profitability. Our analy-
ses show that for these six Asian developing countries, the level of foreign bank
penetration is more important than whether foreign bank conducted M&A activ-
ities with domestic banks. Moreover, foreign banks have stronger influence for
countries with foreign entry restrictions than countries without foreign entry re-
strictions. Foreign bank entry has both direct effect on current year and one-year
lag effect in the following year for domestic banking industry. In general, foreign
direct effects are stronger than foreign one-year lag effect.
Our analysis may be extended in to two directions. Firstly, it would be interesting
to study the effect of foreign banks entry on others countries, not only developing
countries but also developed countries. This requires the access to larger sample of
bank data. If I could find access to the data base BankScope it would be helpful.
Secondly, in this chapter, we have used macro - economic variables, bank variable
and foreign entry variable. There are may be other variables we could use, such
as banking market concentration ratio, or some index related with domestic su-
pervision and so on. We leave these suggestions for further research.
Conclusion
A l’aide de l’indice de productivite´ de Malquist, le chapitre 2 a appre´hende´ les
frontie`res d’efficience des banques chinoises avant et apre`s fusion et acquisitions,
pour la pe´riode allant de l’anne´e 1998 a` l’anne´e 2007. J’utilise l’indice de pro-
ductivite´ de Malquist, mais aussi l’indice de changement de l’efficacite´ technique
(TEC), l’indice de changement technique dans la technologie de production (TECP),
et deux e´le´ments re´sultats d’une de´composition du TECP, l’indice de change-
ment de l’efficacite´ technique pure (PTEC) et l’indice de changement de l’efficacite´
d’e´chelle (SEC), pour mesurer la diffe´rence de productivite´ entre les 14 banques
commerciales chinoises, de l’anne´e 1998 a` l’anne´e 2007.
Les re´sultats de l’indice de productivite´ de Malquist TFP sur la pe´riode de 1998
a` 2007 montrent que la croissance de la productivite´ a e´te´ la plus e´leve´e de 2005
a` 2006. La productivite´ a en revanche diminue´ de 2002 a` 2004. Les 14 banques
commerciales chinoises que nous avons analyse´es dans ce chapitre ont connu en
moyenne un taux de croissance annuel de la productivite´ de 6,3 % de 1998 a`
2007. Les re´sultats montrent que 12 de ces 14 banques ont un TECP plus grand
que 1, alors que seulement 5 des 14 banques ont un TEC plus grand que 1. Les
ame´liorations technologiques (PTEC) sont la principale raison de l’ame´lioration
de la productivite´ (l’indice de productivite´ de Malmquist). L’informatisation,
l’informatisation de la communication la ge´ne´ralisation des guichets automatiques
bancaires (GAB), pourraient avoir aide´ ces banques a` accroˆıtre leur revenu et
re´duire leurs couˆts.
En conside´rant les banques chinoises de 1998 a` 2007, il apparait que les ban-
ques commerciales ont inte´gre´ des ame´liorations technologiques et obtenu des
re´sultats en termes de productivite´. Industrial and Commercial Bank of China
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Ltd, the Agricultural Bank of China, the Bank of China Co., Ltd et the China
Construction Bank Corporation sont les quatre plus grandes banques commer-
ciales en Chine. Les re´sultats de mon e´tude indiquent que ces grandes banques
n’ont pas les meilleures performances. Ils montrent que les 4 grandes banques ont
un SEC infe´rieur a` 1. La moyenne ge´ome´trique du SEC de 4 grandes banques est
plus petit que celui des 10 autres banques commerciales, meˆme si les 4 grandes
banques ont une taille plus grande. Leur taille n’a donc pas aide´ ces grandes ban-
ques a` ame´liorer leur efficacite´ conside´re´e en termes d’e´chelle.
La mauvaise gestion interne, la faible qualite´ du service, les preˆts non performants
et l’intervention du gouvernement sont probablement les principales raisons de
l’inefficacite´ en termes d’e´chelle dans le secteur bancaire chinois en particulier
pour les 4 grandes banques. Globalement, les 10 petites banques commerciales
chinoises ont une meilleure performance que les 4 grandes banques. Par exemple,
China Minsheng Banking Corporation and Guangdong Development Bank Co.,
Ltd pre´sentent les meilleurs gains de productivite´.
Les re´sultats de l’analyse de re´gression du chapitre 3 montrent qu’un environ-
nement macro-e´conomique sain et un syste`me structure´ interne de l’industrie ban-
caire sont tre`s importants pour les banques commerciales chinoises. Si le taux de
croissance du PIB se maintient, accompagne´ d’une bonne politique mone´taire et
bancaire, un controˆle de l’inflation, les directeurs de banque doivent donc pour-
suivre l’optimisation de la structure de leurs banques et ame´liorer encore les pro-
cessus ope´rationnels internes.
Le chapitre 3 a contribue´ a` analyser l’effet complexe de l’entre´e des banques
e´trange`res sur l’industrie bancaire domestique. J’ai e´tudie´ trois modes d”entre´e des
banques e´trange`res: (1) la cre´ation d’une nouvelle filiale, (2) la fusion-acquisition
avec une banque publique (une grande banque ge´ne´rale), et (3) la fusion-acquisition
avec des Joint Stock Banks (des petites banques spe´cialise´es). Lorsque le marche´
des preˆts standards n’est pas entie`rement couvert par les banques domestiques,
l’entre´e des banques e´trange`res peut ame´liorer l’e´tat des affaires, compensant ainsi
l’effet d’e´cre´mage sur les banques domestiques, et elle peut finalement augmenter
le niveau d’activite´ et / ou les be´ne´fices de l’industrie bancaire domestique. Le
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mode`le a analyse´ les conditions dans lesquelles les actionnaires des banques do-
mestiques augmentent leurs be´ne´fices apre`s un mode d’entre´e correspondant aux
cas (2) et (3).
Selon les pre´diction du mode`le the´orique, pour maintenir les be´ne´fices des banques
domestiques dans le cas de cre´ation d’une nouvelle filiale de banque e´trange`re,
l’autorite´ nationale devrait mettre en place des restrictions portant sur un in-
vestissement initial minimum de capitaux e´trangers pour les banques e´trange`res.
Pour les cas de fusions-acquisitions avec des grandes banques et de fusions-acquisitions
avec les Joint-Stock Banks, l’autorite´ nationale devrait optimiser le niveau de la
proprie´te´ e´trange`re, pour maintenir la rentabilite´ de l’industrie bancaire domes-
tique.
Les re´sultats de chapitre 3 e´tablissent les conditions d’une entre´e profitable pour les
deux partenaires (les banques domestiques et e´trange`res) dans le cadre de diffe´rents
modes d’entre´e. Ils montrent que tous les modes d’entre´e peuvent s’ave´rer posi-
tifs si l’on conside`re le secteur bancaire national dans son ensemble. Les analyses
ulte´rieures porteront sur l’endoge´ne´isation de la strate´gie de l’entrant e´tranger.
Le chapitre 4 a utilise´ la base de donne´es “Thomson One”, montre l’impact
de l’entre´e des banques e´trange`res sur la performance des banques domestiques
dans six pays en de´veloppement d’Asie, avant et apre`s des ope´rations de fusions-
acquisitions dans le secteur bancaire domestique. J’ai utilise´ les donne´es de la
Chine, l’Inde, l’Indone´sie, la Core´e, les Philippines et la Tha¨ılande pour la pe´riode
1998-2011.
Le mode`le de re´gression empirique propose´ est base´ sur le mode`le the´orique du
chapitre 3. Les variables de´pendantes repre´sentent la rentabilite´ des banques do-
mestiques. Les variables inde´pendantes sont des variables macro-e´conomiques,
des variables caracte´ristiques des banques domestiques et des variables d’entre´e
des banques e´trangers. Les re´gressions examinent a` la fois l’effet fixe du pays
et l’effet fixe du temps. Suivant Drukker (2003) et Wooldridge (2002), j’ai fait
e´galement des tests d’he´te´rosce´dasticite´ (test du rapport de vraisemblance) et
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d’auto-corre´lation (test Wooldridge).
Les re´sultats indiquent que l’entre´e des banques e´trange`res est associe´e a` une
augmentation de la rentabilite´ des banques domestiques. Les analyses montrent
que, pour ces six pays asiatiques en de´veloppement, le niveau de pe´ne´tration des
banques e´trange`res est plus important. En outre, les banques e´trange`res ont une
influence plus forte dans les pays ou` il y a des restrictions a` l’entre´e des banques
e´trange`res que dans les pays sans restrictions a` l’entre´e des banques e´trangers.
L’entre´e des banques e´trange`res pre´sente a` la fois un effet direct sur l’anne´e en
cours et un effet en de´calage l’anne´e suivante pour l’industrie bancaire domestique.
En ge´ne´ral, les effets directs de l’entre´e des banques e´trangers sont plus forts que
l’effet en de´calage.
Mon travail peut se prolonger dans le futur dans deux directions. Tout d’abord, il
serait inte´ressant d’e´tudier l’effet de l’entre´e des banques e´trange`res dans d’autres
pays, pas seulement sur des pays en de´veloppement mais aussi des pays de´veloppe´s.
Ce travail ne´cessiterait l’acce`s a` un plus grand e´chantillon de donne´es bancaires
comme l’acce`s a` la base de donne´es BankScope. En second lieu, j’ai utilise´ dans le
dernier chapitre des variables macro-e´conomiques, des variables relevant des car-
acte´ristiques des banques et des variables d’entre´e des banques e´trangers. D’autres
variables sont peut-eˆtre utilisables, comme des ratios de concentration du marche´
bancaire, ou des indicateurs de supervision interne.
Appendix A
Proof of Lemma 1 and
Proposition 1
A.1 Proof of Lemma 1
From the first order conditions of equations (3.1) and (3.2), we deduce xs =
tsfsS
2
− ys and xj = fjfjJ2 − yj where S = α¯s + αsAe and J = α¯j + αjAe. Given
equation (3.3), we obtain A∗ = b/(2− b′). Given the positivity of b, the positivity
of A∗ is a consequence of the positivity of the denominator 2 − b′, which defines
the conditions of existence of a stationary value of A. We then deduce x∗s and x
∗
s
by substituting the equilibrium value of A in equations (3.1) and (3.2). Equation
(3.3) can be written as At+1 = aAt+b where a and b are constant deduced from the
parameters of the model. The equilibrium A∗ is then globally stable if −1 < a < 1.
After substitutions, this condition can be rewritten as b′ < 2 
A.2 Proof of Proposition 1
After some arithmetic and given the results of lemma 1, we obtain x∗s =
1
2
fsts[
(fstsα¯s+mfjtj α¯j)
2−fstsαs−mfjtjαjαs+
α¯s] − ys, x∗j = 12fjtj[ (fstsα¯s+mfjtj α¯j)2−fstsαs−mfjtjαjαj + α¯j] − yj. We also obtain pi∗s = (α¯s +
fstsα¯s+mfjtj α¯j
2−fstsαs−mfjtjαjαs)× [(1− fs)ys +
f2s ts
4
(α¯s +
(fstsα¯s+mfjtj α¯j)
2−fstsαs−mfjtjαjαs)] and similarly pi
∗
j =
(α¯j +
fstsα¯s+mfjtj α¯j
2−fstsαs−mfjtjαjαj)× [(1− fj)yj +
f2j tj
4
(α¯j +
(fstsα¯s+mfjtj α¯j)
2−fstsαs−mfjtjαjαj)]. We then can
deduce the positivity of the derivatives of these four terms relatively to fs, fj, ts,
and tj. The relative shares of the SOB and the JSBs markets can be written as
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∆ = x
∗
s+ys
x∗j+yj
= fsfsαsB+α¯s
fjtjαjB+α¯j
, where B = b
2−b′ . The derivative of ∆ with respect to fs
is N/D where D is always positive and after simplification N can be written as
tsαsB(tjαjB + α¯j) + fstsαsB
′αj − fjtjαjB′α¯s where B′ > 0 is the derivative of B
in fs. We confirm that αs/α¯
′
s ≥ αj/α¯′j is a sufficient condition for the positivity
of N . More generally, if αs/α¯
′
s is not so small compared to αj/α¯
′
j, N remains
positive. Similar analysis can be made using the derivative of ∆ with respect to
ts. 
Appendix B
Proof of Lemma 2 and
Proposition 2
B.1 Proof of Lemma 2
The first order condition of expression (3.4) provides the equation xb1 =
tbfb
2
−
k(ys + myj). We then proceed as in the proof of lemma 1 to determine xs1 and
xj1 from the first order conditions of equations (3.5) and (3.6). We then use (3.7)
to calculate A1. Given the positivity of the numerator, the positivity of A1 is
still a consequence of the positivity of the denominator 2 − b′, which defines the
conditions of existence of a stationary value of A. We then by substitution can
deduce xb1, xs1 and xj1. Using the same method employed in the proof of lemma
3.1, we can easily verify the equilibrium A1 is then globally stable if b
′ < 2 
B.2 Proof of Proposition 2
The multiplier effect is represented by an improvement in the state of affairs A
after entry of the foreign bank. The intensity of the cream skimming effect is
defined by the amount of k. From lemma 3.3, the new state of affairs is A1 =
A∗ + fb1tbα¯b
2−b′ . The differences in the profits of the SOB and JSBs between the case
of setting up new local foreign subsidiary and the benchmark case are shown in
pis1−pi∗s = (1−fs)(1−k)ys fb1tbα¯b2−b′ αs+ f
2
s ts
4
fb1tbα¯b
2−b′ αs[
fb1tbα¯b
2−b′ αs+2(α¯s+A
∗αs)]−k(1−
fs)ys(α¯s+A
∗αs). The first and third components of this expression decrease when
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k increases (corresponding to an increases cream skimming effect). The bigger the
value of fb1tbα¯b
2−b′ (multiplier effect), the greater the value of A1, then the greater
value of the first and second components in the above equation. If the multiplier
effect dominates the “cream skimming” effect, the SOB’s profit will be bigger than
in the benchmark model; if the “cream skimming” effect dominates the multiplier
effect, the SOB’s profit will be smaller than in the benchmark model. The proof
is the same for the part of proposition 2 concerning the evolution of JSBs’ profits

Appendix C
Proof of Lemma 3 and
Proposition 3
C.1 Proof of Lemma 3
The method already in use for the proofs of lemmas 1 and 2 provides the results
of lemma 3 
C.2 Proof of Proposition 3
The differences in the profits of the SOB between the case of foreign bank entry
via M&A activity with the SOB and the benchmark case are shown as pis2− pis =
(1−λ)(α¯s +A2αs)× [(1− fs)ys + (1− fs)k′myj + f2s tsb( α¯s +A2αs)]− (α¯s +A∗αs)×
[(1− fs)ys + f2s ts4 (α¯s + A∗αs)] with A2 = fstsbα¯s+mfjtj α¯j2−b” . This expression increases
with k′ (positive cream skimming effect) but also, directly and through A2, it
increases with all improvements to the management efficiency tsb for the joint
venture, from the management efficiency of the SOB ts. This difference decreases
with all increases in foreign minority shareholding, as formulated in the lemma.
The profit differences for a given JSB between the case of foreign bank entry
through M&A activity with SOB and the benchmark case are shown as pij2−pi∗j =
(α¯j +A2αj)× [(1− fj)(1− k′)yj + f
2
j tj
4
(α¯j +A2αj)]− (α¯j +A∗αj)× [(1− fj)yj +
f2j tj
4
(α¯j + A
∗αj)]. The difference depends indirectly (through A2) and positively
on management efficiency ttb improvements, the bigger value of A2. It does not
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depend on the size of the minority shareholding λ. But this expression decreases
with all increases in k′ (increase in cream skimming effect) 
Appendix D
Proof of Lemma 4 and
Proposition 4
D.1 Proof of Lemma 4
See proofs of lemmas 1 to 3 
D.2 Proof of Proposition 4
The profit differences for the SOB between the case of foreign bank entry through
M&A activity involving the FB and the JSBs, and the benchmark case are shown
as pis3− pi∗s = (α¯s +A3αs)× [(1− fs)(1− k′′)ys + f
2
s ts
4
(α¯s +A3αs)]− (α¯s +A∗αs)×
[(1− fs)ys + f2s ts4 (α¯s + A∗αs)]. This expression decreases with the increases in k′′
(negative cream skimming effect). The greater the improvements in technological
efficiency tjb, the higher the value of A3, the higher the value of the equation (pos-
itive multiplier effect).
Part (ii) of the Proposition is a consequence of the expression of the cost C.
The profit differences for JSBs between the case of foreign bank entry through
M&A activity, between the FB and the JSBs and the benchmark case are shown
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as pij3 − pi∗j = (1 − λ′)(α¯j + A3αj) × [(1 − fj)(yj + k′′ys/m) +
f2j tjb
4
(α¯s + A3αj)] −
(α¯j + A
∗αj)× [(1− fj)yj + f
2
j tj
4
(α¯j + A
∗αj)].
In relation to profit changes for the JSBs, the greater the improvement to techno-
logical efficiency tjb, the higher the value of A3, the higher value of the equation
(positive multiplier effect). Increases in foreign minority shareholding, result in
decreased JSBs profit. So there is a negative minority foreign investment effect.
Finally, the previous expression increases with an increase in k′ (increased “cream
skimming” effect). From these observation, we can deduce part (iii) of Proposition
4. 
Appendix E
Proof of Proposition 5
E.1 Proof of Proposition 5
We compare the profits of domestic banks before and after the creation of a new
subsidiary by the foreign bank. As a consequence of Proposition 2, A1 = A
∗+ fbtbα¯b
2−b′ .
We can then simply write α¯j +A1αj = α¯j +A
∗αj + α¯bd1 and express the difference
as (pis1 + mpij1) − (pi∗s + mpi∗j ) = α¯bd1[(m + 1)m(α¯j + A∗αj)] + α¯2bd21(m + 1)m +
α¯bd1[(1 − k)yj(m − mfj + m2 − m2fs) + mf
2
j tj+m
2f2s ts
4
(α¯j + A
∗αj)] − mkyj(α¯j +
A∗αj)(m − mfs + 1 − fj). The positivity of this expression is equivalent to the
following inequality: α¯b(m+1)(α¯j+A
∗αj)+α¯2bd1(m+1)+α¯b[(1−k)yj(1−fj+m−
mfs)+
mf2s ts+f
2
j tj
4
(α¯j+A
∗αj)] > kyj(α¯j+A∗αj)(m−mfs+1−fj)/d1. We introduce
the following simplifying assumptions: 1− fj +m−mfs = P and α¯j +A∗αj = Q.
Then, α¯2bd1(m+1)+α¯b[(1−k)yj(1−fj+m−mfs)+(
mf2s ts+f
2
j tj
4
+m+1)(α¯j+A
∗αj)] >
kyj(α¯j + A
∗αj)(m−mfs + 1− fj)/d1.
If we take the parameter α¯b, as the control variable of the economic and financial
authority, the left side of this condition takes the form of a quadratic expression
with positive infinite limits. The roots of the associated equation are expressed as
α¯b =
−[(1−k)yjP+(
mf2s ts+f
2
j tj
4
+m+1)Q]
2d1(m+1)
±
√
[(1−k)yjP+(
mf2s ts+f
2
j
tj
4
+m+1)Q]2+4(m+1)kyjPQ
2d1(m+1)
. Be-
cause 2d1(m+1) > 0, (1−k)yjP +(mf
2
s ts+f
2
j tj
4
+m+1)Q > 0 and −kyjPQ/d1 < 0,
the discriminant of the quadratic equation ∆ > 0 and
−[(1−k)yjP+(
mf2s ts+f
2
j tj
4
+m+1)Q]
2d1(m+1)
<
0. This quadratic equation then has two distinct roots, one positive and one neg-
ative. The positive root determines the lowest value satisfying the positivity of
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the difference between the two profits. This positive root is then the lowest value
admitted for α¯b to make the creation of the subsidiary globally positive for the
domestic banking sector 
Appendix F
Simulation and Proof of
Proposition 6
F.1 Simulation
Examples of the evolution of the “welfare” index with different values
of δ in the case of M&A with the SOB
(1) With the following values of parameters: fs = 0.6, fj = 0.5, ts = 0.5, tj = 0.6,
m = 10, k = 0.3, yj = 2, Q = 5, d2 = 0.05, n = 0.2, δ = 0.45 and r = 0.05, we
obtain an interior solution λ∗1 = 0.8621 (Figure F.1).
(2) With δ = 0.5 and keeping all other parameters unchanged, we obtain a con-
strained corner solution λ = 1 and an unconstrained solution λ∗2 = 4.4655 (Figure
F.2).
(3) Given a value of δ = 0.2 and keeping all other parameters as the same value as
before, we find that the constrained maximum of the “welfare” of domestic bank-
ing industry is at the point λ∗ = 0 and an unconstrained maximum for a negative
value of λ′ (Figure F.3).
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F.2 Proof of Proposition 6
Consider the welfare term given by the following expression:
ΠSOB =
(1− δ){(1− λ)m2(Q+ λd2)[(1− fs)(1 + k)yj + f
2
s (ts + λn)
4
(Q+ λd2)]
+m(Q+ λd2)[(1− fj)(1− k)yj +
f 2j tj
4
(Q+ λd2)]}
+ δ{m2(Q+ λd2)[(1− fs)(1 + k)yj + f
2
s (ts + λn)
4
(Q+ λd2)]
+m(Q+ λd2)[(1− fj)(1− k)yj +
f 2j tj
4
(Q+ λd2)]}/r
When δ = 1, i.e. when only the wealth of the initial shareholders matters, only the
two last terms are positive. Both increase with λ, which provides a corner solution
λ∗ = 1. When δ = 0, i.e., when only the wealth of the future domestic shareholders
matters, only the two initial terms are positive. The second strictly increases with
λ. The first can be or not monotonically decreasing when λ varies from 0 to 1, but
in all cases ends-up vanishing for λ = 1. According to the relative weights of the
first and the second terms, the welfare term increases monotonically (if the second
term dominates), and decreases monotonically or reaches an interior maximum for
a value of λ between 0 and 1 (if the first term dominates). The conclusions are
the same if δ is close to 0 .
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Figure F.1: An interior solution in λ∗.
 
Figure F.2: A corner solution λ∗ = 1.
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Figure F.3: The maximum level of total welfare of domestic banking industry
is at the point of λ∗ = O.
Appendix G
Calculus derivation after the
simplification
According to different profits level of our theoretical model, domestic banks would
make a strategic selection between three entry modes we mentioned before.
Recall that the original equations of domestic banks’ profits before and after en-
tering into emerging banking market are as below:
1. Benchmark model
pi∗s = (α¯s + A
∗αs)× [(1− fs)ys + f
2
s ts
4
(α¯s + A
∗αs)]
mpi∗j = m(α¯j + A
∗αj)× [(1− fj)yj +
f 2j tj
4
(α¯j + A
∗αj)]
2. The profit of domestic banks if foreign bank creation of a new subsidiary.
pis1 = (α¯s + A1αs)× [(1− fs)(1− k)ys + f
2
s ts
4
(α¯s + A1αs)]
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mpij1 = m(α¯j + A1αj)× [(1− fj)(1− k)yj +
f 2j tj
4
(α¯j + A1αj)]
3. The profit of domestic banks if foreign bank conduct M&A activity with SOB.
pis2 = (1− λ)(α¯s + A2αs)× [(1− fs)ys + (1− fs)k′myj + f
2
s tsb
4
(α¯s + A2αs)]
mpij2 = m(α¯j + A2αj)× [(1− fj)(1− k′)yj +
f 2j tj
4
(α¯j + A2αj)]
4. The profit of domestic banks if foreign bank conduct M&A activity with JSBs.
pis3 = (α¯s + A3αs)× [(1− fs)(1− k′′)ys + f
2
s ts
4
(α¯s + A3αs)]
mpij3 = m(1− λ′)(α¯j + A3αj)× [(1− fj)(yj + k′′ys/m) +
f 2j tjb
4
(α¯s + A3αj)]
Then, we introduce the following simplifying assumptions:
• the two types of domestic banks initially have the same total number of high
category loans ys = myj.
• the foreign bank induces the same cream skimming effect, whatever the style
of entry it chooses, i.e., k = k′ = k′′.
• α¯s = mα¯j and αs = mαj, i.e. the relative size of each bank and the relative
indirect effect of an increase in the distribution of credit on the return of
each bank are proportional.
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So, we rewrite equations of domestic banks’ profits before and after entering into
emerging banking market are as below:
1. Benchmark model
pi∗s = m
2(α¯j + A
∗αj)× [(1− fs)yj + f
2
s ts
4
(α¯j + A
∗αj)]
mpi∗j = m(α¯j + A
∗αj)× [(1− fj)yj +
f 2j tj
4
(α¯j + A
∗αj)]
2. The profit of domestic banks if foreign bank creation of a new subsidiary.
pis1 = m
2(α¯j + A1αj)× [(1− fs)(1− k)yj + f
2
s ts
4
(α¯j + A1αj)]
mpij1 = m(α¯j + A1αj)× [(1− fj)(1− k)yj +
f 2j tj
4
(α¯j + A1αj)]
3. The profit of domestic banks if foreign bank conduct M&A activity with SOB.
pis2 = (1− λ)m2(α¯j + A2αj)× [(1− fs)(1 + k)yj + f
2
s (ts + λn)
4
(α¯j + A2αj)]
mpij2 = m(α¯j + A2αj)× [(1− fj)(1− k)yj +
f 2j tj
4
(α¯j + A2αj)]
4. The profit of domestic banks if foreign bank conduct M&A activity with JSBs.
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pis3 = m
2(α¯j + A3αj)× [(1− fs)(1− k)yj + f
2
s ts
4
(α¯j + A3αj)]
mpij3 = m(1− λ′)(α¯j + A3αj)× [(1− fj)(1 + k)yj +
f 2j (tj + λ
′n)
4
(α¯j + A3αj)]
Recall that the effective level of activity A are shown as below:
A∗ =
fstsα¯s +mfjtjα¯j
2− fstsαs −mfjtjαj
A2 =
fstsbα¯s +mfjtjα¯j
2− fstsbαs −mfjtjαj
A3 =
fstsα¯s +mfjtjbα¯j
2− fstsαs −mfjtjbαj
Then we rewrite the simplified version of the effective level of activity A as below:
A∗ = mα¯j
fsts + fjtj
2−mfstsαj −mfjtjαj
A2 = mα¯j
(fsts + fjtj) + fsn
2−mfstsαj −mfjtjαj −mfsαjλn
A3 = mα¯j
(fsts + fjtj) + fjλ
′n
2−mfstsαj −mfjtjαj −mfjαjλ′n
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Compared A2 with A
∗, the numerator of A2 increases by mα¯jfsλn and the de-
nominator of A2 decreases by mfsαjλn, then the value of A2 is greater than A
∗.
Similarly, compared A3 with A
∗, the numerator of A3 increases by mα¯jfjλ′n and
the denominator of A3 decreases by mfjαjλ
′n, then the value of A3 is also greater
than A∗
Because of our assumption for benchmark model that the financial efficiency of
SOB is bigger that the financial efficiency of JOBs fs ≥ fj, and here we sup-
pose that foreign bank consider the same level of foreign investment λ = λ′, the
numerator of A2 increases equal to or more than the numerator of A3 and the
denominator of A2 decreases equal to more than the denominator of A3. So we
could get A2 ≥ A3. If fs = fj, A2 = A3; and if fs > fj, A2 > A3.
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